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Information Asymmetry and the 
Protection of Ordinary Investors 
Kevin S. Haeberle* 
To some, the reductions in information asymmetry provided by the main 
securities-specific disclosure, fraud, and insider-trading laws help ordinary 
investors in meaningful ways. To others, whatever their larger social value, 
such reductions do little, if anything for these investors. For decades, these 
two sides of this investor-protection divide have mostly talked past each other. 
This Article builds on economic theory to reveal something striking: The 
reductions in information asymmetry provided by the core securities laws 
likely impose a long-overlooked cost on buy-and-hold ordinary investors. 
More specifically, I explain why there is much reason to believe that the 
reductions take away investment return from these investors, while 
providing them with only limited benefits. Thus, the article presents a 
serious challenge to conventional wisdom on information asymmetry and 
the protection of ordinary investors, and argues in favor of a shift in 
investor-protection efforts away from the main securities laws and to areas 
of regulation that have received relatively little attention to date.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Many have long maintained that the core securities laws’ dampening 
effect on information asymmetry is a good thing for the ordinary 
individuals who invest in the stock market. Whatever their view on the 
larger social value of reducing this asymmetry, law and economics 
scholars have disputed the idea that these disclosure, fraud, and insider 
trading rules help these individuals. As Professors Easterbrook and 
Fischel memorably put it, the investor-protection rationale “is as 
unsophisticated as the investors it is supposed to protect.”1 However, to 
date, the criticism has largely been limited to the idea that reducing 
information asymmetry is a more or less neutral — and therefore 
wasteful — proposition from the perspective of these investors (qua 
investors). 
This Article takes a closer look at how the reductions in stock market2 
information asymmetry provided by the core securities laws affect 
ordinary investors. In particular, it builds on economic theory to show 
something striking: Those reductions likely take away investment 
return for buy-and-hold ordinary investors, while assisting them in only 
limited ways. The identification of these effects should result in a better 
understanding of securities law — one that helps bridge the investor-
protection divide introduced above. It should also shift any focus on 
investor-protection efforts to less prominent areas of regulation, such 
as those relating to trading market structure and investment advisor 
duties. 
It has long been said that the core securities laws reduce information 
asymmetry among stock market participants. However, for decades 
now, there has been a great divide on the implications of any such 
reduction for the ordinary individuals who invest in the market.3 (These 
individuals include everyone from mom and pop investors to other non-
 
 1 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the 
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 694 (1984) [hereinafter Mandatory 
Disclosure]; see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 297 (1996) [hereinafter ECONOMIC STRUCTURE]. 
 2 My use of the term “stock market” in this Article generally refers only to the 
secondary market for public company stock in the United States. Any examination of 
efforts to reduce informational unevenness in related markets might result in different 
conclusions. See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency 
Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1049-50 (1995) (discussing the likely effects of 
mandating issuer disclosure to prevent extraction of value from ordinary investors by 
unscrupulous promoters in the IPO market).  
 3 The investor-protection divide extends beyond issues relating to information 
asymmetry. My focus in this Article is specific to information asymmetry and the well-
being of ordinary investors. 
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professional, outside investors with far more wealth than the typical 
investor. Informally stated, the group includes all everyday individual 
investors, with the line between them and the pros drawn somewhere 
short of George Soros and peers.) On one side of the divide are those 
regulators, legislators, judges, and scholars who can be termed investor-
protection advocates. They view informational unevenness as a negative 
thing for these investors, and applaud efforts to reduce it on their 
behalf.4 On the other side is what I call the law and economics 
orthodoxy. Lawmakers and scholars in this camp generally view the 
unevenness as a neutral proposition for ordinary investors, and 
challenge at least the rationale of the relevant laws.5  
For the investor-protection advocates, the good work done by the 
core securities laws is clear. The required disclosure gets valuable 
 
 4 The most prominent examples of this view are found in the insider trading and 
disclosure timing contexts. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 251 (1980) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that “persons having access to confidential material 
information that is not legally available to others generally are prohibited . . . from 
engaging in schemes to exploit their structural informational advantage through trading 
in affected securities”; Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 
72,592 (Dec. 28, 1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, 249) (stating that 
the main goal of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) fair disclosure rule 
requiring simultaneous disclosure of material information is to help increase 
“fundamental fairness to all investors”); Joel Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal 
Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1090 (1985) 
(advocating for a “parity of information” approach to insider trading law); id. at 1115 
(“The primary policy reason for proscribing trading while in possession of material 
nonpublic information is to make investors confident that they can trade securities 
without being subject to informational disadvantages.”). The investor-protection view 
continues to animate the law today. See, e.g., Brief for the United States at 18, Salman v. 
United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016) (No. 15-628), 2016 WL 4088380, at *18 (focusing 
on “the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of . . . information” 
unavailable to outsiders (quotation marks omitted)). 
 5 For prominent dismissals of investor-protection rationales, see Easterbrook & 
Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 1 (focusing primarily on mandatory-
disclosure law). See also Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of 
Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 713 (2006) [hereinafter Essential Role] (“Any 
serious examination of the role and function of securities regulation must sidestep the 
widespread, yet misguided, belief that securities regulation aims at protecting the 
common investor. Securities regulation is not a consumer protection law.”); Henry 
Manne, In Defense of Insider Trading, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1966, at 113, 114 
(1966) [hereinafter Defense] (“[T]he only stock market participants who are likely to 
benefit from a rule preventing insider trading are the short-term speculators and traders, 
not the long-term investors who are regularly stated to be the objects of the SEC’s 
solicitude.”). 
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information out beyond firms,6 the strong prohibition on fraud helps 
ensure that the information is credible,7 and the restriction on insider 
trading limits use of this same information before it is available to all.8 
These interrelated laws9 therefore put ordinary investors, who are by 
definition out in the cold beyond the firm, on a more level playing field 
with insiders and sophisticated professional investors.10 
To supporters of the law and economics view, the lessons from 
modern finance (namely, those arising out of the efficient capital 
markets hypothesis, with the implications of modern portfolio theory 
rounding out the fuller story) dictate that these same laws do little, if 
anything, for ordinary investors.11 Efficient markets, they argue, 
guarantee that stocks are as likely to be overpriced as underpriced,12 
thereby allowing ordinary investors to buy and sell at prices that are as 
 
 6 For a concise broad overview of securities disclosure law, see Kevin S. Haeberle 
& M. Todd Henderson, A New Market-Based Approach to Securities Law, 85 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1313, 1321-23 (2018). 
 7 For a concise broad overview of securities fraud law, see id. at 1323-24. 
 8 For a concise broad overview of insider trading law, see id. at 1324-27. 
 9 The laws are intertwined in more than just obvious ways. For example, the 
restriction on insider trading removes private value from inside information, thereby 
incentivizing insiders to disclose it sooner. E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, 
Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 
309, 333 (1981) [hereinafter Insider Trading] (arguing that, if allowed to trade, insiders 
would hold onto material information for personal gain via quiet trading in the market 
over prolonged periods rather than sharing it with the public promptly); see also Zohar 
Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets, and “Negative” Property 
Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1264 (2001) [hereinafter On Insider Trading] 
(“Absent competition, insiders have no incentive to quickly disclose inside 
information.”). See generally Morris Mendelson, The Economics of Insider Trading 
Reconsidered, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 470, 489 (1969) (reviewing HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER 
TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966)). But see Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. 
Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 879 (1983) (“[I]nsider 
trading in some cases may accelerate the speed of disclosure because the ability to profit 
is dependent on information reaching the market.”); id. at 892. 
 10 See, e.g., Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 
2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249) (noting that investors without 
equal access to information “rightly question whether they are on a level playing field 
with market insiders”). 
 11 The stance is specific to ordinary investors as investors. These scholars recognize 
the benefits of the securities laws for all members of society through their effects on 
capital allocation and corporate governance. See generally infra notes 52–53 and 
accompanying text. 
 12 See generally Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and 
Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970) (describing an efficient market). 
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likely to be inaccurately high as they are to be inaccurately low.13 
Holding a portfolio of such stocks therefore allows ordinary investors 
to diversify away firm-specific variance while still earning a return for 
taking on undiversifiable market-wide risk.14 These conclusions hold 
whether or not firms are required to share information with the public15 
in a credible manner16 while restricting their insiders from trading on it 
beforehand.17 
Despite these strongly staked positions, the important effects of the 
core securities laws on the ordinary individuals who invest — directly 
or indirectly — in public company stock have been overlooked. The 
existence of these effects can be seen by building on a variety of well-
established, yet to date largely unconnected, principles of economics 
and securities law. 
 
 13 See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic 
Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 335-36, 336 n.13 (2003) 
[hereinafter Share Price Accuracy] (stating that in an efficient market, “the possibility 
that the [ordinary] investor will end up ex post worse off . . . by paying too much for 
the share is no greater than the possibility that she will end up better off ex post by 
paying too little”); Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal 
Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 642-43 (1992); see also BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM 
WALK DOWN WALL STREET: THE TIME-TESTED STRATEGY FOR SUCCESSFUL INVESTING 183-
84 (11th ed. 2016). 
 14 See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS, & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES 
OF CORPORATE FINANCE 174-77 (11th ed. 2013); Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 
J. FIN. 77 (1952). For a popular account of modern portfolio theory and these general 
dynamics, see MALKIEL, supra note 13, at 222-23. 
 15 See, e.g., Fox et al., Share Price Accuracy, supra note 13, at 335-36 (“[A] law 
requiring issuers to disclose more information than they would otherwise voluntarily 
disclose is unnecessary to protect ordinary investors from buying shares at prices that 
are unfair in the sense of being on average greater than their actual values.”). 
 16 See, e.g., id.; Richard A. Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action as We 
Know It, 4 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 11 (2007) (“[I]nvestors are fully protected from simple 
securities fraud through diversification. They need no remedy.”). 
 17 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 1, at 262 
(stating that “the only investors who lose out to insiders are those who have already 
decided to sell” at current market prices, and that “if managers are knocked out of the 
market, [ordinary] investors are not the winners”); Manne, Defense, supra note 5, at 115 
(“[T]he long-term investor may turn out to be the individual who in fact sells to the 
insider. But since he is normally selling for reasons unrelated to the insider’s trading, 
and would be selling in any event, he should be indifferent to the identity of his buyer. 
Actually, he may benefit from the insider’s buying on good news, as the average price 
received may be higher than without insider trading.”); see also Henry G. Manne, The 
Case for Insider Trading, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 17, 2003, 12:03 AM), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB104786934891514900 (“[I]nsider trading does little or no direct harm to any 
individual trading in the market, even when an insider is on the other side of the 
trades.”). 
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The story begins with the costs of information asymmetry for 
investors. Those costs are well-established in the economics literature 
— specifically in that literature relating to market microstructure 
economics.18 These costs mainly come in the form of reduced liquidity. 
Specifically, they appear as part of the spread in between the prices at 
which traders can buy and sell stock on demand (spread costs), and as 
part of the movements in market prices that follow larger trading 
activity (market-movement costs). Investors are also harmed by 
information asymmetry as a result of steps they (and their investment 
fund intermediaries) take to avoid these costs. These avoidance costs 
include the loss of utility that results from opting not to trade in light 
of the spread and/or market-movement costs, as well as any resources 
expended on trading in a way that bypasses those costs.19 
Microstructure, bridged with mainstream finance, has also 
established that sophisticated buyers discount the price of illiquid 
stocks, thereby preserving the expected return they demand on those 
 
 18 Market microstructure is a branch of economics focused on the forces at play 
between buyers and sellers in markets. For a seminal treatise on microstructure 
authored by a former chief economist of the SEC aimed at a broad audience, see 
generally LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR 
PRACTITIONERS (2003). For decades, legal scholars failed to sufficiently consider 
microstructure. This failure stands out in contrast to the tremendous focus on financial 
economics by those scholars (and judges). Thus, incorporation of the microstructure 
principles in focus below into the law has been limited despite robust incorporation of 
the principles of financial economics into the same. For a prominent example in the 
law, see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (“Because most publicly 
available information is reflected in market price, an investor’s reliance on any public 
material misrepresentations, may be presumed for the purposes of a Rule 10b-5 
action.”). For prominent examples from the scholarly literature on securities law, see 
supra notes 11–17 and accompanying text. Notably, an emerging literature on 
microstructure and the law now exists. See infra note 182 and accompanying text. 
 19 I briefly touch on all of these costs in Part II.A below, and detail them in a 
contemporaneous work that, unlike the present ordinary investor-specific work, looks 
at the problem of stock market information asymmetry from a social welfare 
perspective. Kevin S. Haeberle, The Information-Asymmetry Story of Securities Regulation 
[hereinafter Information-Asymmetry Story] (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author). Interestingly, one might argue that broader precaution costs incurred in 
response to uncertainty in stocks’ fundamental values represent a cost of information 
asymmetry. See Mahoney, supra note 13 (discussing work undertaken to identify fraud 
to determine more accurate values). But even if one included the aforementioned 
precaution costs in a broader analysis of information asymmetry, the analysis and 
conclusions in this Article would remain substantially the same. In my related work on 
information asymmetry from a social perspective, I think more about the extent to 
which such precaution costs should factor into the information asymmetry story of 
securities regulation more generally. 
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financial instruments.20 This illiquidity discount is also relevant to the 
information-asymmetry-based illiquidity presented in the form of 
spread and market-movement costs. But, crucially, the close 
examination of stock trading undertaken below shows that the discount 
affects different investors differently — and that it presents a net benefit 
to many. 
More specifically, my theory starts with a basic premise: the discount 
at issue is determined by the marginal investor.21 For that reason, the 
size of the discount will reflect the impact of information asymmetry 
costs on that investor. The identity of this unobservable investor remains 
unknown.22 But the true impact of information-asymmetry-based 
illiquidity on any investor turns on her investment horizon, as these 
costs are amortized over that horizon and the return that comes along 
with it.23 All else being equal, investors with shorter horizons are 
therefore more susceptible to being harmed by these costs, and those 
with longer ones less susceptible. But at least buy-and-hold ordinary 
investors — namely, those who passively index the market (or some 
part thereof) over the long haul — likely have investment horizons that 
are significantly longer than those of this elusive marginal investor.24 
Consequently, I argue, the prevailing discount is likely larger than that 
necessary to compensate these longer-term investors for the 
information asymmetry costs they incur. Paradoxically, these investors 
therefore likely receive more of the very thing they target by investing 
 
 20 Such discounts were noted in a broad way by legal scholars as early as 1981. See 
Easterbrook, Insider Trading, supra note 9, at 325. And some of their general securities 
law and tax law implications were later modeled. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: 
Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market, 77 VA. L. REV. 945 (1991); Yair 
Listokin, Taxation and Liquidity, 120 YALE L.J. 1682 (2011). But the seminal economics 
work modeling these discounts in the 1980s has been largely overlooked by legal 
scholars. That work and its progeny are discussed infra Part III. 
 21 See, e.g., Henry P. Shearman, PRACTICAL ECONOMICS 193 (1st ed. 1922). 
 22 See, e.g., John R. Graham, Do Taxes Affect Corporate Decisions? A Review, in 
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE: CORPORATE FINANCE 150 (George M. 
Constantinides, Milton Harris & René M. Stulz eds., 2013) (noting the fact that “the 
identity . . . of the marginal investor(s) who set prices between debt and equity are 
unknown”); see also Leonie Bell & Tim Jenkinson, New Evidence of the Impact of 
Dividend Taxation and on the Identity of the Marginal Investor, 57 J. FIN. 1321, 1330-31 
(2002). 
 23 I detail this point and ones following it in this paragraph in building on the 
economics literature regarding the relationship between investor time horizon and 
financial instrument liquidity. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 24 I discuss the investment horizons associated with different types of investing 
supra Part I, and connect that to my theory infra Part II.C. 
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(expected return) thanks to the presence of better-informed 
participants in the market. 
To be clear, the added expected return — just like that associated 
with risk25 — earned by a longer-term investor is not free. Even buy-
and-hold investors can gain utility from making trades with some 
frequency — namely, by managing their portfolio risk to ensure it lines 
up with their current preferences.26 To the extent buy-and-hold 
investors earn an extra return thanks to information asymmetry, yet 
maintain stock positions within their investment portfolio longer than 
they otherwise would due to the same, their information asymmetry 
premium comes at a cost. But to the extent the value of that premium 
exceeds the cost of the lost portfolio adjustment these investors would 
have pursued, they benefit from information asymmetry on net. Related 
costs incurred in any effort to trade without having to pay the typical 
spread and market-movement costs must also be considered.27 But 
remarkably, for investors who are investing in the precise manner 
suggested by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and 
social science (i.e., by buying and holding a broad index),28 securities-
specific compulsory disclosure, prohibitions on fraud, and limitations 
on asymmetrically-informed trade are alarming.29 
These positive theories have considerable implications for the 
investor-protection divide and the law. With respect to the divide, they 
dictate that each side is off, and that a more nuanced understanding of 
information asymmetry and investor protection is in order. With 
respect to the law, they suggest that any focus on protecting ordinary 
 
 25 See generally William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market 
Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964); BREALEY ET AL., supra note 
14, at 24-25. 
 26 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra Parts II.A, III.A. 
 28 See infra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 29 Interestingly, some have noted how the disclosure and fraud laws can run against 
the interests of buy-and-hold investors in other ways. E.g., Ayres, supra note 20, at 989-
90 (arguing that in a market where information is reflected in prices after some 
reasonable period, “‘buy and hold [investors]’ . . . will want their managers to spend less 
time and money talking to the market because there is a lower probability . . . that they 
will sell in any given period”); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, 
Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 
1070-71 (1990) (arguing that insiders should be able to make “strategic 
misrepresentations [that benefit the firm] even in situations where nonpublic 
information is leaked or where there is trading by insiders”); Mahoney, supra note 13, 
at 634-35 (noting instances in which stockholders will prefer that the corporation make 
false or misleading statements to the market). 
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secondary market investors should be on tinkering with distinct laws 
— and perhaps even on rolling back the core laws in focus here. 
Of course, if firms and their executives disclosed little, lied often, and 
traded frequently, stock market information asymmetry might be so 
acute that it would cause serious trading frictions, if not the failure of 
the market altogether.30 The result would not be good for ordinary 
investors qua investors, as it would deprive them of opportunities to 
invest. Nor would it be good for ordinary investors as citizens, as they 
would lose out on living in a society where firms could raise capital 
efficiently, among other things. Nonetheless, it must be remembered 
that even the major laws under examination here have only a marginal 
effect on information asymmetry. The precise size of that marginal effect 
is subject to a distinct longstanding debate in securities law31 and well 
beyond the scope of this Article. But it is worth highlighting here at the 
outset that firms and their agents have market-based incentives to share 
information in a credible manner without engaging in pre-disclosure 
trading.32 Thus, my thesis is not that all reductions in information 
asymmetry have the negative effects on buy-and-hold ordinary investors 
introduced above while providing them with only limited assistance. 
Instead, it is that the reductions in information asymmetry provided by 
the core securities laws (i.e., reductions in information asymmetry at the 
margin) have those negative effects and limited upside. 
The fuller version of this story proceeds as follows. Part I provides 
background on the stock market, specifically by describing the four 
main types of trading pursued in it. Part II then builds on that 
description, starting with a brief overview of the costs information 
asymmetry imposes on market participants. It then offers the positive 
theory on how the reduction of those costs provided by the laws in focus 
affects buy-and-hold ordinary investors, and expands on that theory to 
provide related insights about how that reduction affects ordinary 
investors as a whole. Finally, Part IV explores what these theories 
should mean for the investor-protection divide and the law. 
 
 30 See HARRIS, supra note 18, at 317 (“When the asymmetric information problem is 
particularly severe . . . spreads may be so wide that no trading occurs,” thereby resulting 
in “the market ha[ving] failed.”). Foreign stock markets have failed along these lines. 
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from 
Securities Market Failure, 25 J. CORP. L. 1, 10-16 (1999) (comparing Poland’s success 
with the Czech Republic’s failure following the fall of the Iron Curtain). 
 31 See infra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 144–147 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE FOUR MAIN TYPES OF TRADING 
Investors may dominate our imagination when we think about those 
participating in the stock market. But in the market itself, interactions 
are between traders. Sometimes those traders are investors themselves. 
Many individuals trade “directly” through online brokerage accounts. 
So, too, do many institutions such as large insurance companies. 
However, other times those traders are large investment funds, buying 
and selling on behalf of a wide range of individual and institutional 
investors. Here forward, I use this fine distinction between traders and 
investors. Using it allows for a focus not only on those that buy and sell 
in the market (the traders) and those whose capital is being ventured 
(the investors), but also on the distinction between the two. This initial 
Part therefore provides a quick overview of an increasingly prominent 
model of the stock market that revolves around four main types of 
trading (portfolio trading, information trading, noise trading, and 
market making) and the investors who engage in them, directly or 
indirectly.33 In so doing, it provides important background for the 
theories about information asymmetry and ordinary investors offered in 
the next Part. 
A. Portfolio Trading 
Portfolio trading centers on the accumulation, balancing, and 
liquidation of the components of diversified portfolios of stocks.34 
Those engaged in this trading target the healthy risk premium that has 
traditionally been available to those who hold varied portfolios of public 
company stock over sustained periods.35 Buy-and-hold ordinary 
 
 33 Models along these general lines are commonly found in microstructure works. 
See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 18 (providing a similar model, albeit with additional detail 
and sub-categories unnecessary for present purposes). They have also been present in 
the securities law literature for some time. See, e.g., Goshen & Parchomovsky, On Insider 
Trading, supra note 9, at 1239-40, 1243, and have been deployed with more frequency 
over the past few years, infra note and accompanying text. 
 34 Some models of the stock market have referred to much of this type of trading 
(namely, the liquidation of portfolios for consumption purposes) as that associated with 
“liquidity trading.” See, e.g., Goshen & Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, supra note 9, 
at 1238-39. The nomenclature used in this Article is more in line with that found in the 
emerging literature on microstructure and the law referenced supra note 18, and, in my 
mind, more helpful to understanding trading strategies. 
 35 See ELROY DIMSON, PAUL MARSH & MIKE STAUNTON, TRIUMPH OF THE OPTIMISTS: 101 
YEARS OF GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS 42 (2002) (finding, on average, 6.7% after-
inflation annual returns on public stocks in the United States over sustained investment 
periods throughout the twentieth century). Gains over the long haul over the past 
almost two decades have been consistent with these results. See, e.g., DIMENSIONAL FUND 
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investors are usually engaged in this type of trading.36 Many merely buy 
and hold a broad index of the entire market, and watch the index 
balance itself as sample stocks increase or decrease in value.37 Others 
similarly buy and hold, yet target a more specific set of stocks based on 
their desire for a more specific risk and return. Still, even when 
combined, these two sets of buy-and-hold investors make up only a 
subset of the portfolio trading universe. After all, institutions engage in 
portfolio trading as well.38 In the end, the general target here is the same 
whether the capital at issue is supplied by ordinary individuals or 
sophisticated institutions: an investment return derived from taking on 
market-wide risk. 
Investors often engage in portfolio trading directly. For example, 
some buy-and-hold ordinary individuals take part of their surplus each 
month and use it to purchase a broad sampling of public company stock 
through a retail-level brokerage account. Over the years, they might 
 
ADVISORS, MATRIX BOOK: 2017 (2017) (ebook) (showing an annualized nominal rate of 
return of 9.6% for an index of domestic public firms since 2002).  
 36 See generally HARRIS, supra note 18, at 488-91 (discussing the buy-and-hold 
approach); ZVI BODIE, ALEX KANE & ALAN J. MARCUS, INVESTMENTS 357 (10th ed. 2013) 
(“A passive strategy aims only at establishing a well-diversified portfolio of securities 
without attempting to find under- or overvalued stocks. Passive management is usually 
characterized by a buy-and-hold strategy.”). 
 37 See, e.g., John C. Bogle, Reflections on ‘Toward Common Sense and Common 
Ground?,’ 31 J. CORP. L. 31 (2007) (noting “the passive investment strategy followed by 
the index fund — a fund that, in essence, owns the entire stock market . . . [and] carries 
only tiny operating expenses and almost no portfolio transaction costs.”); Robert C. 
Pozen, Curbing Short-Termism in Corporate America: Focus on Executive Compensation, 
GOVERNANCE STUD. (Brookings Inst., D.C.), May 2014, at 2 (discussing “quasi-indexers” 
as those with “highly diversified portfolios of publicly traded securities, and also a high 
degree of ownership continuity since they seldom trade.”); Mahoney, supra note 13, at 
636 (“[U]ninformed investors engage in no search. They act as price-takers and 
consequently, do not attempt to ‘beat the market’ by trading on the basis of information 
that happens to come their way. The rational uninformed investors will hold the market 
portfolio and trade only in response to changes in her wealth or consumption.”). 
 38 E.g., Anne Tergesen & Jason Zweig, The Dying Business of Picking Stocks, WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2016, 12:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-dying-business-of-
picking-stocks-1476714749 (“Pension funds, endowments, 401(k) retirement plans 
and retail investors are flooding into passive investment funds . . . . Public pension plans 
had 60% of their U.S. stock allocations in index funds in 2015, up from 38% in 2012, 
according to research from Greenwich Associates. At endowments and foundations, the 
index-fund share rose to 63% from 40% in that time period.”); Our Clients, NUVEEN, 
https://www.tiaa.org/public/assetmanagement/clients-we-serve (“We offer both 
traditional and alternative strategies that seek to provide attractive long-term 
investment solutions for endowments and foundations.”) (last visited Oct. 11, 2019); 
see, e.g.,Solutions for Insurers, VANGUARD, https://institutional.vanguard.com/web/c1/ 
solutions/insurers/resources (last visited Oct. 12, 2019). 
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adjust pieces of the portfolio they amass by purchasing stocks that are 
thought to provide higher returns at higher risk, while selling off other 
stocks (or perhaps bonds) associated with more conservative investing. 
Or, if their personal tastes and preferences call for less risk, they might 
do the opposite. For example, as their stock positions grow relative to 
their bond and other holdings, they sell stocks to get back into their 
optimal total investment portfolio. Whatever their exact approach 
throughout the period in which they hold their portfolios, in the end, 
these individuals generally seek to liquidate those portfolios in the 
future to consume. 
Still, most ordinary investor portfolio trading occurs indirectly 
through investment fund intermediaries.39 For example, an average 
individual retirement saver might make things easier on herself by 
simply opting for some portion of her paycheck to go to a 401(k) 
account every two weeks. Once the account is funded, investment funds 
like those operated by Fidelity and Vanguard can do the portfolio 
trading on her behalf. As a general matter, these institutional-level 
traders are constantly engaging in portfolio trading to meet redemption 
or subscription demands from investors based on the latter’s savings 
versus consumption patterns. To the extent they are targeting a specific 
segment of the market (namely, one with a specific risk characteristic), 
these funds will also have to buy and sell to adjust their index from time 
to time.  
Insurance companies, university endowments, and a wide range of 
wealthy extraordinary individuals and entities also entrust investment 
funds to amass, maintain, and liquidate diversified portfolios of stocks 
on their behalf.40 The especially wealthy in this group may even take 
the steps necessary to engage in their portfolio trading directly, without 
the help of outside investment intermediaries. All of these investors may 
pursue a purely passive, broad indexing buy-and-hold approach to their 
portfolio trading. But they also often opt for more active management 
of even this type of “passive” portfolio.  
Crucially, the great majority of stocks held in an indexed investment 
are accumulated and held over sustained periods. For a direct trading 
 
 39 See Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2013 to 2016: 
Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RES. BULL., Sept. 2017, at 18-19 
(noting that only 13.9% of families owned individual stocks, yet 52.1% invested through 
retirement accounts); see also, e.g., INV. CO. INST., 2017 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 
30 (57th ed. 2017), https://www.ici.org/pdf/2017_factbook.pdf (“Retail investors (i.e., 
households) held the vast majority (89 percent) of the $16.3 trillion in US mutual fund 
assets.”). The proportion of long-term mutual fund assets held by retail investors is even 
higher (95 percent). See id.  
 40 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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retirement saver, this might mean accumulating their diversified 
portfolio of stocks and holding much of it over the course of decades.41 
Rebalancing investment positions in the portfolio in light of changing 
risk preferences, stock-to-bond ratios, or the like to maximize investor 
utility still plays a role for these direct traders and their indirect-trading 
brethren. But indexing portfolio trading investors typically sell out of 
only a small fraction of their holdings each year.42 Indeed, for those who 
index the entire market, their portfolio of stocks balances itself 
throughout the life of their investment. For example, Microsoft makes 
up less of the portfolio when its value goes down relative to other 
holdings in the portfolio, and more of the portfolio when its value 
moves in the opposite direction. 
B. Information Trading 
Information trading, as the terminology suggests, mainly involves 
buying and selling based on information as to companies’ fundamental 
values that is not yet reflected in market prices.43 This trading centers 
on the use of information to identify (and buy) stocks with market 
prices that are lower than their fundamental values,44 and to spot (and 
sell) stocks with market prices that are higher than their fundamental 
values.45 
Much information trading is attributable to sophisticated hedge 
funds, private equity funds, and actively managed mutual funds.46 
 
 41 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 42 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.  
 43 Microstructure models focus on “informed trading.” See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 
18, at 6; Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, Informed Trading 
and Its Regulation, 43 J. CORP. L. 817, 825 (2018) [hereinafter Informed Trading] 
(“Informed traders buy or sell a stock due to private information providing them with 
a superior estimate of a stock’s value than that implied by the stock’s current price.”). 
My focus on “information trading” is intentionally broader than this focus on only those 
who are actually better informed than the market when they trade. 
 44 E.g., Fox et al., Informed Trading, supra note 43, at 826 (“Fundamental value 
information arises from observing varied pieces of information that are publicly 
available or involve observable features of the world and analyzing this information in 
a sophisticated way that enables an assessment of a stock’s value superior to that implied 
by the current market price.”); Goshen & Parchomovsky, Essential Role, supra note 5, 
at 721 (“Pricing information requires analyzing the information to determine its value, 
and then trading based on discrepancies between price and value.”) (emphasis added). 
 45 E.g., Fox et al., Informed Trading, supra note 43, at 826; Goshen & Parchomovsky, 
Essential Role, supra note 5, at 721. 
 46 E.g., Fox et al., Informed Trading, supra note 43, at 826 (“Examples of 
fundamental value information traders are actively managed mutual funds, hedge funds, 
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However, like with portfolio trading, individuals too can engage in 
information trading directly. While hopelessly outmatched by 
institutional traders in the overwhelming majority of all cases, the 
direct-trading little guy can win in this game at times. Sometimes such 
wins come as a result of conduct that is illegal under insider trading law. 
Other times it is perfectly consistent with the law, such as when it is the 
product of skilled information collection and analysis by extraordinary 
individuals working with bits and pieces of immaterial information 
from firms47 or privately generated material information generated from 
outside them.48 
Although there are limits on hedge fund investing,49 all individuals, 
whether ordinary or superiorly skilled, can engage in information 
trading through at least actively managed mutual funds. There has long 
been concern that many such funds are to some strong degree (or even 
entirely) engaged in mere portfolio trading.50 To the extent an ordinary 
investor is participating in the market through such a fund, the investor 
is engaged in the relevant degree of portfolio trading and not 
information trading. In other words, the ordinary investor is still 
pursuing something at least closer to a buy-and-hold approach for some 
part of the portfolio — even if more active management was 
contemplated. 
Whatever the precise nature of much “actively managed” trading, the 
well-established positive externality that arises out of information 
traders’ profit-seeking work should not be overlooked. As a byproduct 
of their informed buying and selling, these traders bring new 
 
pension funds, and the professionally managed portfolios of wealthy individuals and 
non-profits.”). 
 47 E.g., id. at 869 n.165 (noting “trades based on one or more bits of non-public 
immaterial information from within an issuer,” and stating that “existing interpretations 
of Rule 10b-5 in fact do not find [this trading] illegal”). 
 48 E.g., id. at 883 (“[A] non-issuer institution that has generated information of 
value for assessing an issuer’s stock (or has already purchased it, directly or indirectly, 
from a person that has generated it) can use this information in three possible ways: 
(1) trade on the information; (2) provide it privately to certain other traders; or 
(3) announce the information publicly.”).  
 49 Generally, only “accredited investors” may invest with hedge funds. See 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.501(a) (2017). Accreditation is accomplished through surpassing either a net 
worth threshold or an annual income threshold. Id. at § 230.501(a)(5)-(6). 
 50 E.g., Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1961, 2018 (2010). Supporting the same underlying concerns, an earlier 
empirical study concluded that “institutions as a whole seem to do little more than hold 
the market portfolio.” See Jonathan Lewellen, Institutional Investors and the Limits of 
Arbitrage, 102 J. FIN. ECON. 62, 77 (2011). 
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information to the market.51 In this way, they help generate stock prices 
that better reflect information dispersed throughout society52 — and 
therefore the larger benefits that are thought to flow from those more 
accurate prices.53 It is for this reason that commentators have long 
extolled the virtues of these market participants’ efforts.54 
Importantly, despite these benefits, information trading is at the root 
of the concern for informational unevenness held by investor-
protection advocates. This concern has traditionally been voiced as a 
general one for fairness.55 But as I explain in Part II.A, market 
microstructure economics provides a more tangible way of thinking 
about the costs that better-informed traders impose on others. 
Lastly, information trading generally involves a short investment 
timeframe relative to that associated with portfolio trading.56 Investors 
engaged in information trading might have much reason to load up on 
an individual stock. But maintaining that investment position involves 
taking on firm-specific risk beyond that which can be diversified away,57 
 
 51 E.g., HARRIS, supra note 18, at 6 (“[Informed] [t]raders . . . estimate fundamental 
values [and] cause prices to reflect their value estimates.”). 
 52 See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 
519-20 (1945) (providing one of the seminal works on the role of markets in 
incorporating far-ranging pieces of information into prices). 
 53 The two main social benefits of enhanced price accuracy are said to be more 
efficient capital allocation and better corporate governance. For a seminal work on these 
connections in the legal literature, see Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated 
Disclosure, and Underwriter Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005, 
1013-14 (1984). See also Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Cost of 
“Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 979 (1992). 
 54 E.g., Goshen & Parchomovsky, Essential Role, supra note 5, at 764 
(“[I]nformation traders will be able to generate the benefits associated with close analyst 
coverage, such as efficient pricing . . . and better monitoring of agency costs.”); id. at 
715 (asserting that the essential role of “securities regulation is . . . to facilitate and 
protect the work of information traders”). 
 55 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 56 See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text (discussing the index approach to 
investing); see also HARRIS, supra note 18, at 488 (comparing yearly turnover of active 
and passive portfolio managers). 
 57 See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors 
and Firms, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 148, 149 (1990) (“Arbitrage, however, is often risky and 
risk cannot be completely sold off in the market. If, for example, an asset is underpriced 
relative to its fundamental value, and a smart investor buys it, he has to bear the risk 
that before mispricing is eliminated or reduced the fundamental value actually falls. In 
this case, his arbitrage trade results in a loss even though it was ex ante attractive. In 
addition to fundamental risk, the smart investor bears the risk that the mispricing gets 
worse before it is eliminated . . . .”); supra note 14 and accompanying text. Recent work 
suggests that the costs of pursuing an information-based strategy are far larger than 
many had previously thought. See Ian Ayres & Edward Fox, Alpha Duties: The Search 
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among other notable costs.58 For these reasons, all else being equal, 
information traders will want to exit that position sooner rather than 
later.59 Indeed, even for mutual funds, turning over (i.e., changing) all 
portfolio holdings within a single year is not uncommon.60 Moreover, 
the average overall holding period for a public company stock has been 
reported to be just a third of a year,61 something that also reflects the 
 
for Excess Returns and Appropriate Fiduciary Duties, 97 TEX. L. REV. 445, 448-50 (2019). 
More specifically, Professors Ayres and Fox note that those seeking an alpha return 
“sacrifice some of the benefits of diversification, low fees, or appropriate risk.” Id. at 
448. The authors then provide empirical support for the conclusion that “the required 
offsetting alpha to justify diversification, exposure, and excess-fee losses are often 
surprisingly large.” Id. at 515. 
 58 See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to 
Finance, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1990, at 19, 21 (1990) (“[T]here are several reasons that 
it makes sense to assume that arbitrageurs have short horizons. Most importantly, 
arbitrageurs have to borrow cash or securities to implement their trades, and as a result 
must pay the lenders per period fees . . . . The structure of transaction costs thus induces 
a strong bias toward short horizons . . . . In addition, the performance of most money 
managers is evaluated at least once a year and usually once every few months, also 
limiting the horizon of arbitrage. As a result of these problems, resources dedicated to 
long-term arbitrage against fundamental mispricing are very scarce.”). 
 59 See, e.g., id.; Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 57, at 152-53 (arguing that short-term 
arbitrage will be more common than long-term arbitrage due to the costs of holding 
securities for longer periods for arbitrageurs). 
 60 E.g., JOHN C. BOGLE, COMMON SENSE ON MUTUAL FUNDS 380 (2010) (“Twenty-five 
years ago, fund portfolio turnover averaged 30 percent annually; today, it averages nearly 
90 percent.”); HARRIS, supra note 18, at 488 (“Active managers often have turnover rates of 
more than 100 percent per year.”); NEW YORK STOCK EXCH., REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STOCK 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 13 (2010) (“Annualized turnover of 
stocks traded on the NYSE is now estimated to be over 100%, which means that on average 
an NYSE-listed company experiences trading volume each year exceeding the total number 
of its issued and outstanding shares.”); Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, 
and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 295-96 (2012) (discussing the high turnover 
rates of actively managed investment funds); Laura Bruce, Mutual Fund Turnover and Taxes, 
MARKETWATCH (Mar. 11, 2002, 12:18 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/mutual-
fund-turnover-and-taxes (“William Harding, an analyst with Morningstar, says the average 
turnover ratio for managed domestic stock funds is 130 percent. ‘Many managers claim to 
be long-term investors when, in reality, the average mutual fund manager is turning the 
portfolio more than once a year.’”); Stocks Traded, Turnover Ratio of Domestic Shares (%) - 
United States, WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.TRNR? 
locations=US&view=chart (last visited Aug. 30, 2019) (reporting an overall turnover rate 
for U.S. domestic public stocks of well over 100% over the past 20-plus years). But see Anne 
M. Tucker, The Long and the Short: Portfolio Turnover Ratios and Mutual Fund Investment 
Time Horizons, 43 J. CORP. L. 581, 612 n.168, 627 (2018) (finding similar turnover rates for 
active and passive mutual funds, and suggesting “closet indexing” by the “active” funds). 
 61 E.g., In re Morton’s Rest. Grp. S’holders Litig., 74 A.3d 656, 670 n.77 (Del. Ch. 
2013) (summarizing several studies of modern equity turnover); Taking the Long View, 
ECONOMIST (Nov. 24, 2012), https://www.economist.com/business/2012/11/24/taking-
the-long-view (“[T]he average time that people hold a stock on the New York Stock 
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short investment time horizon of these traders. Some of these numbers 
must be viewed along with a more complete understanding of the 
contemporary stock market.62 But their general content alone is 
nonetheless striking and indicates the pervasiveness of active trading by 
information traders today.63 
C. Noise Trading 
The third broad type of trading (noise trading) can be thought of as 
information trading gone wrong. Noise trading involves buying and 
selling based on what the trader believes is superior information, yet far 
more often than not fails due to a flawed approach.64 The problem in 
the approach is generally traceable to interpretations of information that 
 
Exchange has tumbled from eight years in 1960 to four months in 2010.”); Jesse 
Eisinger, Challenging the Long-Held Belief in ‘Shareholder Value’, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK 
(June 27, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/challenging-the-
long-held-belief-in-shareholder-value (“The average holding period of a stock was eight 
years in 1960; today, it’s four months.”). 
 62 A very large portion of stock trading goes through professional intermediaries. 
See infra Part I.D (describing market making). Thus, a very large portion of sales of 
shares from one “natural investor” (e.g., a retiree) to another such investor (e.g., a 
retirement saver) are recorded as two trades. One trade takes place when the retiree 
sells the shares to the intermediary, and another when that intermediary passes those 
shares on to the retirement saving buyer. See id. Turnover rates reported by, for 
example, exchanges thus may reflect some double counting of trades between actual 
investors. In my research into stock turnover rates, I have not seen evidence of this 
intermediation — and thus double counting — being considered. Nevertheless, even 
when that intermediation is considered, these rates remain strikingly high. And while 
this intermediation would increase turnover rates for trading on exchanges, it should 
not increase turnover rates for individual funds. In short, even if what amounts, in 
substance, to a transaction between a natural seller and a natural buyer on an exchange 
may involve two trades in many cases, the turnover of shares by a mutual fund involves 
just one.  
 63 In 2010, Chief Justice Strine of the Delaware Supreme Court published an essay 
“highlight[ing] the underlying facts regarding how short a time most stockholders, 
including institutional investors, hold their shares” and, alternatively stated, “rais[ing] 
the basic facts regarding the short-term horizons of most equity owners . . . .” Leo E. 
Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations 
Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long-
Term?, BUS. LAW., Nov. 2010, at 1-2. In the essay, he reviews a very large number of 
sources to support his concern for the short duration of active investors. Those sources 
report annual share turnover for actively managed mutual funds in the 100% range, and 
hedge-fund turnover in the 300% range. See id. at 8-12. He also notes that “[o]ne 
respected academic commentator suggests that even pension funds typically turn over 
their portfolios in a year.” Id. at 10 (quotation marks omitted). 
 64 E.g., J. Bradford DeLong et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. 
ECON. 703, 706-07 (1990); Fox et al., Informed Trading, supra note 43, at 831-32; 
Shleifer & Summers, supra note 58, at 23. 
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do not comport with consensus views over even their investment 
horizon, such as a trade based on a development that has already been 
priced into the stock.65 Noise traders have therefore long been denied 
even categorization along with information traders, even though their 
focus is — from at least their perspective — on using information to 
earn trading profits.66 
Like with portfolio trading and information trading, those behind 
noise trading can be ordinary individuals. To get a sense of what is 
perhaps the most common type of investor operating in this way, one 
need only think of the day traders sitting at home during the internet 
boom of the late 1990s, reading “Heard on the Street”-type columns and 
submitting orders to trade from their laptops from the couch. But you 
could also conjure up other images. Countless institutions no doubt 
engage in the same basic behavior, albeit surrounded by larger screens 
in fancier work spaces. But even when those engaged in noise trading 
are ordinary individuals or investment funds using ordinary individuals’ 
capital, noise trading looks very different than buy-and-hold investing. 
Given the nature of their trading motivations, noise traders likely 
have an investment horizon that is loosely on par with that of 
information traders described in the preceding section. But some no 
doubt fail to even understand the basics of asset pricing,67 and therefore 
stay in undiversified positions longer than the average savvy 
information trader. Still, relative to the universe of buy-and-hold 
ordinary investors described at the outset of this Part, these active 
traders likely have short investment horizons. 
D. Market Making 
Unlike the three types of trading introduced thus far, the final broad 
type, market making, does not aim to amass investment positions in 
stock. Quite the opposite, this non-directional trading seeks to generate 
income by supplying a specialized intermediation service for any trader 
in the market68 — and targets little to no inventory of stock at the end 
 
 65 E.g., Fox et al., Informed Trading, supra note 43, at 831 (“Noise traders believe 
they have information that permits a more accurate appraisal of an issuer’s value, but 
that information either is already reflected in price or is irrelevant to developing a more 
accurate appraisal.”); DeLong et al., supra note 64, at 706-07; J. Bradford DeLong, 
Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers & Robert J. Waldmann, The Size and Incidence 
of the Losses from Noise Trading, 44 J. FIN. 681, 683 (1989). 
 66 E.g., Goshen & Parchomovsky, Essential Role, supra note 5, at 714-15 (treating 
information traders and noise traders as distinct types of traders). 
 67 See supra notes 14 & 57 and accompanying text. 
 68 E.g., HARRIS, supra note 18, at 279 (referring to these traders simply as “dealers”). 
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of each day.69 These professionals supply liquidity to other market 
participants — specifically, to those that seek to transact on demand 
rather than searching around for a true non-intermediary counterparty 
or patiently waiting until such a counterparty comes their way.70 Today, 
market makers often meet this demand with respect to every individual 
stock in the market.71 They also now generally supply these services 
relating to the trading of exchange-traded funds and other financial 
instruments in that same market and abroad.72 And they generally do 
all of this via computer-driven trading, rather than through individual 
men in color-coded jackets standing on a trading floor.73 
Unlike with portfolio, information, and noise trading, ordinary 
investors — by definition — do not engage in professional market 
making. Still, a more detailed description of market makers and how 
they operate is crucial for understanding the extent to which the core 
securities laws serve a significant investor-protection role post-IPO. 
Market makers supply their services by quoting bid prices and ask 
prices around stocks’ current market values.74 Their bid quotes 
generally represent firm offers to buy stock.75 Bid prices are thus those 
 
 69 Walter Bagehot, The Only Game in Town, 27 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 12-14 (1971); Mark 
B. Garman, Market Microstructure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 257 (1976); see also HARRIS, supra 
note 18, at 283. 
 70 See HARRIS, supra note 18, at 278. Consistent with this description, many refer to 
these traders today as “professional liquidity providers.” 
 71 See, e.g., Chris Concannon, Program on the Law and Economics of Capital Markets 
Workshop: High-Frequency Trading, COLUMBIA LAW SCH. (Nov. 29, 2012), https://capital-
markets.law.columbia.edu/events/high-frequency-trading [http://perma.cc/Y5RS-67NG] 
(describing an electronic trading firm and market maker that trades equities across 
exchanges and platforms). 
 72 E.g., Virtu Financial, Inc., Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 
1933 (Form S-1), at 1 (Mar. 10, 2014), http://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-
0001592386/6f927b41-4dd3-4a2b-83d1-ff125d154b90.pdf (asserting that they provide 
liquidity “in more than 10,000 securities and other financial instruments on more than 
210 unique exchanges, markets and liquidity pools in 30 countries around the world”); 
Customized Liquidity, VIRTU FINANCIAL, https://www.virtu.com/market-making/ 
customliq/veq/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2018) (“In equities, we provide access to liquidity 
through a range of global stocks, ETPs and ADRs, including many difficult-to-trade 
names.”). 
 73 Today, algorithms deployed by a handful of trading firms are thought to dominate 
the business of market making. See Jonathan A. Brogaard et al., High Frequency Trading 
and Price Discovery, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 2267, 2271-78 (2014) (using a NASDAQ data 
set to show that high-frequency traders supply liquidity for over half of all trades); 
Albert J. Menkveld, High-Frequency Trading and the New Market Makers, 16 J. FIN. 
MARKETS 712, 714 (2013). 
 74 See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 18, at 297. 
 75 When displayed on trading platforms, the law — not just industry practice — 
ensures that the quotes are firm. See Dissemination of Quotations in NMS Securities, 
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in return for which traders can sell stock on demand. Their ask quotes 
likewise represent the prices at which they are prepared to sell in the 
same fashion. Ask prices are thus those at which traders can buy stock 
immediately with certainty. For example, assume the market currently 
values a stock at $10.50 per share. If market makers were quoting 
$10.49 best (highest) bid prices and $10.51 best (lowest) ask ones 
around that value, then other traders could sell the stock to them by 
accepting the $10.49 bid price, or buy it from them by paying the $10.51 
ask price. In order to transact on demand against these prices, these 
sellers thus must sell at a discount (they get only $10.49 per share for 
this stock valued at $10.50), and these buyers must pay a premium 
(they must pay $10.51 per share for the $10.50 stock). 
Market makers post only a limited quantity of shares at their best 
(highest) bid prices and best (lowest) ask ones. Beyond those “inside 
spread”76 quotes, they then post a series of successively inferior ones. 
So, they may quote a best bid of $10.49 and ask of $10.51 around a 
market value of $10.50 for a stock, but they may only post 5,000 shares 
at each. Beyond that, they might quote 5,000 additional shares at each 
“tick” below the highest $10.49 bid price ($10.48, $10.47, $10.46, and 
so on) and 5,000 additional shares at each tick above the lowest $10.51 
ask price ($10.52, $10.53, $10.54, and so on). Those successively 
inferior prices of course increase the discount large opposite-side 
traders must accept to sell on demand, and increase the premium other 
such traders must pay to buy on demand. In other words, the average 
price per share they receive in return for stock will be lower than that 
associated with the best (highest) bid price, and the average price per 
share they pay in return for stock will be higher than that associated 
with the best (lowest) ask price. 
Market makers do not specialize in understanding the fundamental 
values of the instruments they trade.77 Instead, their primary mission is 
to nail down those instruments’ market values. As the nomenclature 
suggests, they aim to find the value around which to place their quotes 
 
Rule 602(b), 17 C.F.R. § 242.602(b)(2) (2017) (requiring displayed quotes to be legally 
binding offers to trade). 
 76 The term “inside spread” is traceable to a vertical depiction of prices, where they 
are set out with bids below a stock’s market value and asks above that value — meaning 
that the best (highest) bid and best (lowest) ask surrounding the current market value 
fall in the inside of the diagram once a slew of successively inferior bids and asks are 
added to it. 
 77 E.g., HARRIS, supra note 18, at 277 (“[Market makers] tend to . . . not know much 
about . . . the fundamental values of the instruments that they trade.”). 
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so that a two-sided market of buyers and sellers arises.78 Doing so allows 
them to profit by purchasing shares from the sellers at bid prices that 
are below the ask prices for which they turn around and sell them to 
the buyers — thereby earning their bid-ask spread. For example, the 
market makers above would make two cents per share each time they 
were able to buy shares at their bid prices of $10.49 opposite some 
traders’ sell orders, and then sell those shares to other traders’ buy 
orders at their slightly higher $10.51 ask prices. In an electronic stock 
market where about 7 billion shares are transacted each day in U.S. 
stocks alone,79 even bid-ask spreads far smaller than the one in this 
example can produce considerable profits. 
Importantly, stocks generally do not just have a single “market price.” 
Instead, as the above description indicates, they have at least two: one 
at which traders can buy them on demand (the ask price), and one in 
return for which they can sell them in that manner (the bid price). And 
those two market prices are generally distinct from the price that 
represents a stock’s current market value. That current market value is, 
as a general matter, simply halfway between the market prices.80 
* * * 
This initial Part provided a basic description of the four main types of 
trading in the stock market today. Whether conducted “directly” 
through brokerage accounts or indirectly through investment-fund 
intermediaries, portfolio-, information-, and noise-trading investors 
accumulate stock positions with an eye on financial gain. The high-
speed-trading institutions that are in the business of making markets 
with an aim of zero inventory at the end of each trading day are after 
the same. But as this quick overview alone makes clear, the motivations 
and strategies inherent in each of these four types of trading vary 
greatly. An understanding of the differences along these lines 
emphasized above provides much of the background for the remainder 
of this Article. 
 
 78 E.g., id. at 401 (“Market makers simply try to discover the prices that produce 
balanced two-sided order flows.”); see also supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 79 U.S. Equities Market Volume Summary, CBOE, http://www.bats.com/us/equities/ 
market_share [http://perma.cc/4PWJ-99UJ] (providing the daily trading volume across 
the market); see also supra note 72. 
 80 See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 18, at 287-88 (“[Market makers aim to] . . . set their 
bid prices just below fundamental values and their ask prices just above”). 
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II. HOW INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AFFECTS BUY-AND-HOLD 
ORDINARY INVESTORS AND THE LARGER UNIVERSE OF ORDINARY 
INVESTORS 
The relevant discord between investor-protection advocates and the 
law and economics orthodoxy is clear.81 But neither side has provided a 
close enough look at how stock market information asymmetry actually 
affects ordinary investors. This Part therefore focuses on interactions of 
the traders introduced in the previous one to explain how information 
asymmetry in the stock market manifests itself in the form of a specific 
type of illiquidity.82 At first glance, the ordinary investor impact of these 
dynamics may seem simple: all ordinary investors get burned by 
information asymmetry due to reduced liquidity. But as detailed in this 
Part, it is well-established that markets discount the value of financial 
assets when they exhibit this type of illiquidity. These discounts, I 
argue, affect different ordinary investors in different ways, more or less 
preserving the expected return for some, but providing too little 
compensation to others and too much to yet others. I thus theorize 
below that while the reductions to information asymmetry provided by 
the core securities laws provide meaningful protection for some 
ordinary investors, they impose a long-overlooked cost on many others. 
In so doing, I explain why buy-and-hold ordinary investors likely suffer 
from this cost and consider the extent to which that suffering might be 
negated by any other benefits of the reductions. I then expand on that 
thinking to consider what this all means for ordinary investors as a 
whole. 
A. The Relevant Illiquidity 
Information asymmetry in the stock market manifests itself in a 
specific type of illiquidity. The starting point for understanding this 
illiquidity is found in interactions between information traders and 
market makers. 
 
 81 See supra notes 4–17 and accompanying text. 
 82 A broader set of information asymmetry concerns for investors can also be 
identified — namely, those relating to fairness and perceptions of fairness. An even 
broader set of concerns for society no doubt exists as well, including those for confidence 
in the market. I discuss the fairness and perceptions-of-fairness concerns in Part III.A 
below. In my related broader work, I discuss all of these concerns in more detail. See 
Haeberle, Information-Asymmetry Story, supra note 19. 
  
168 University of California, Davis [Vol. 53:145 
Market makers are generally at an informational disadvantage when 
savvy information traders transact opposite their quotes.83 The latter 
generally specialize in spotting market prices that fail to reflect better 
understandings of fundamental values.84 All the while, the former are 
channeling most of their energy to hone in on the market values and 
prices that allow them to earn their spread.85 The problem that often 
comes to fruition for these lesser-informed traders is thus one of getting 
stuck having bought a stock for their market-making inventory from 
information traders that was overvalued, or having sold one from that 
inventory to those traders that was undervalued.86 Either way, they 
suffer direct trading losses traceable to information asymmetry.87 These 
losses to which this information asymmetry problem leads are 
considerable.88 
Market makers respond to the prospect of these losses in two ways: 
by increasing the size of their bid-ask spreads and by increasing the 
sensitivity of their price adjustment triggers. Each response protects the 
market makers from information asymmetry, yet reduces liquidity in 
the market. After all, larger spreads mean larger spread costs, and more 
sensitive price adjustment triggers mean larger market-movement costs. 
In this way, successful market makers pass on the costs of information 
asymmetry to other traders — and therefore investors. 
A brief overview of these costs and dynamics should suffice for 
present purposes.89 With respect to spread costs, the more precise 
 
 83 For the seminal microstructure work modelling the discrepancy in knowledge 
between informed traders and market makers, and the adverse selection costs associated 
with it, see Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in 
a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71, 79 
(1985).  
 84 Supra Part I.B. 
 85 Supra Part I.D. 
 86 See Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 83, at 78. 
 87 See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 18, at 299 (“[I]nformed traders choose the side of the 
market on which they trade, and the dealers end up losing money to them.”); see also 
Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 83, at 79. 
 88 See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 18, at 303 (“[I]n most markets the adverse selection 
spread component accounts for more of the total spread than does the transaction cost 
spread component.”); id. at 297 (noting that market maker fortunes depend on, among 
other things, “how much they lose to informed traders”). 
 89 The spread and market-movement costs summarized here are well-known to the 
economists who study the stock market and the professionals that inhabit it. References 
to the former costs have also become increasingly present in the legal literature on 
securities law over time. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual 
Markets, and the Dog That Did Not Bark, 31 J. CORP. L. 167, 168 (2005) (noting that 
these costs represent an “insider trading tax” for non-insider investors); see also infra 
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market maker response is to post inferior quotes at both inside quotes 
and the ticks surrounding them. That is, there is an increase in the size 
of the spread between market makers’ best (highest) bid quotes and best 
(lowest) ask quotes as well as a decrease in the number of shares quoted 
at them and/or each successively inferior price quote.90 Whether viewed 
as a spread cost or as one associated with inferior pricing, the key point 
is that the premium on top of the current market value that traders 
buying opposite liquidity provider ask prices must pay is larger when 
information asymmetry is heightened. The same goes for the discount 
off that market value that those selling against liquidity provider bid 
prices must accept.91 
The market-movement costs can be similarly summarized. Market 
makers adjust their estimates of value and corresponding prices in 
response to net buying or selling activity in the market.92 For this 
reason, those transacting opposite their quotes in large enough quantity 
cause market movements that drive up their purchase prices when 
buying, and push down their sale prices when selling. Their own trading 
thus causes market prices to move up (down) over the short run, 
thereby resulting in the traders behind it paying (receiving) an average 
price that is higher (lower) than that dictated by the fundamental value 
information known by the market at the time. Their trading is thus said 
to have a “price impact,” or to “leave a footprint.”93 Because the price 
impact/footprint causes prices to move in the opposite direction of their 
short-term trading interest before they can complete that trading, they 
 
note 182. Nevertheless, description of the latter is for the most part missing from that 
literature. In my related work on the stock market information asymmetry and its 
regulation from a social perspective, see supra note 19, I look more closely at each of 
these costs.  
 90 See generally supra Part I.D (describing these aspects of market-maker quotes). 
 91 The total size of the spread (and therefore these costs) is also a product of other 
forces — namely, those that impose other costs on market makers. See, e.g., Ananth 
Madhavan, Market Microstructure: A Survey, 3 J. FIN. MARKETS 205, 242-43 (2000). The 
main other cost incurred by these professionals relates to the inventory risk associated 
with holding assets with values that can vary widely. See id. at 223; supra note 69 and 
accompanying text. Nevertheless, information asymmetry is generally the largest driver 
of spread sizes (and hence spread costs). See supra note 88 and accompanying text.  
 92 See Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 83, at 87; id. at 91 (stating that when a market 
maker experiences unexpectedly high trading volume due to informed trading, “he will 
revise upward his estimate of the probability of an insider arrival and increase the spread 
accordingly”). 
 93 RISHI K. NARANG, INSIDE THE BLACK BOX: A SIMPLE GUIDE TO QUANTITATIVE AND 
HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING 119-20 (2d ed. 2013) (discussing “market impact” and the 
concept of “leaving a footprint” in this context). 
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are said to suffer a cost. The cost comes in the form of an average price 
tag per share that is higher than it would otherwise be. 
Because this cost is traceable to the market maker concern for having 
their quotes adversely selected by better-informed traders, it too is 
rooted in information asymmetry. When market makers expect 
heightened asymmetry, the threshold that triggers these movements 
will be lower — meaning that market-movement costs for those buying 
and selling opposite them will be higher.94 When those professional 
intermediaries sense a reduction in information asymmetry in the 
coming period, the opposite is true.95 All of these behaviors are 
exacerbated by the fact that trading in the market is largely anonymous, 
meaning that even the purchases and sales of portfolio-trading ordinary 
investors can have this price impact despite their extra-informational 
nature — and thus can trigger this second type of information 
asymmetry cost. 
Lastly, it is important to note that this specific type of illiquidity that 
comes in the form of the spread and market-movement costs 
summarized above can be harmful even when those costs are not 
directly incurred. I therefore include a third category in this discussion 
of that illiquidity, and label it “avoidance costs.” This final aspect of the 
illiquidity imposes costs on investors when they seek to avoid one or 
both of the costs detailed above. This avoidance can have two main 
negative effects on investors. The first involves lost utility from not 
trading. In short, expected spread and/or market-movement costs can 
result in a trader opting to sit out the game.96 To the extent this 
forbearance results in an investor missing out on what would otherwise 
be a utility-enhancing portfolio adjustment, profitable investment 
opportunity, or the like, it represents a cost. The second avoidance cost 
involves the allocation of resources toward trading at a lower spread 
and/or market movement cost. This cost is thus incurred when the 
investor has avoided spread and market-movement costs not by 
omitting to trade, but instead by throwing money or other resources at 
 
 94 See Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 83. For empirical evidence supporting this 
point, see Easley et al., Time-Varying Arrival Rates of Informed and Uninformed Traders, 
6 J. FIN. ECONOMETRICS 171, 196 fig.4 (2008) (showing the price impact of individual 
trades in the same stock in different informational environments). 
 95 See Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 83; Easely et al., supra note 94, at 196 fig.4. 
 96 See, e.g., George M. Constantinides, Capital Market Equilibrium with Transaction 
Costs, 94 J. POL. ECON. 842, 859 (1986) (“[I]nvestors accommodate transaction costs by 
drastically reducing the frequency and volume of trade.”). 
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the problem — for example, by engaging in a burdensome search for 
counterparties who are willing to transact at better prices.97 
B. Market Discounts for the Illiquidity 
Markets have a way of dealing with the expected costs associated with 
the thing being bought or sold: they discount the value of that thing. 
The most prominent example of this dynamic is found in asset pricing 
models for stocks, which center on discounts for the market-wide risk 
and opportunity costs inherent in stock investment.98 Rights to 
expected future cash flows (e.g., $100 in one year) are therefore 
purchased at a lower dollar amount today (e.g., $93). 
Stocks’ market prices will be discounted due to other considerations 
as well.99 The robust literature on securities disclosure law provides a 
prominent example of this principle in its examination of the quality of 
corporate disclosure.100 All else being equal, the less that is known about 
an issuer, the larger the risk involved with holding its securities. So this 
discount makes sense as a matter of basic finance.101 
Along these same lines, there are also related discounts due to 
illiquidity in the secondary market. The existence of these discounts is 
 
 97 Some might think that ordinary investors incur information asymmetry costs in 
ways beyond those in focus above, namely by trading directly opposite better-informed 
traders without market-maker intermediation. Although this Article challenges the 
status quo on information asymmetry and ordinary investors, it does not challenge the 
conventional law and economics idea that, on an expected basis, ordinary investors 
engaging in portfolio trading suffer no harm when they transact directly opposite better-
informed traders, or when they transact elsewhere in the market at the same time as 
better-informed traders. See, e.g., Manne, Defense, supra note 5, at 115; see also sources 
cited supra note 17. In my contemporaneous work, I think more about this direct 
trading situation for various types of investors. See Haeberle, Information-Asymmetry 
Story, supra note 19. 
 98 See, e.g., BREALEY ET AL., supra note 14, at 24-25; Sharpe, supra note 25, at 425-42. 
 99 E.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the 
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 925 (1997) (“In 
addition to the incorporation of information about macroeconomic conditions, industry 
conditions, firm management, firm capital structure, and many other factors, the market 
will take into account the value of the securities laws . . . . [I]f the laws provide 
opportunity for managers to extract value from the firm, this will be reflected in lower 
prices for the traded securities.”). 
 100 E.g., Fox et al., Share Price Accuracy, supra note 13, at 336 n.13 (noting the “broad 
consensus that the effect of . . . future disclosure practices [by an issuer] on the expected 
future cash flow to holders of the issuer’s shares is reflected in the price”). 
 101 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
  
172 University of California, Davis [Vol. 53:145 
the subject of a foundational microstructure article102 and the literature 
built on it.103 The core point of the works in this area is that “[i]nvestors 
require a higher expected return from an asset with lower liquidity to 
compensate for its higher trading costs.”104 Simply put, the market 
discounts the value of illiquid stocks.105 
Illiquidity discounts can be material to stock pricing. This point is 
one of the central ones of the foundational Amihud and Mendelson 
article.106 These costs matter because they will generally be incurred 
 
 102 Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread, 17 J. 
FIN. ECON. 223 (1986) [hereinafter Asset Pricing]. The premise also has been at least 
roughly acknowledged in the legal literature dating back to even before the Amihud and 
Mendelson article. See Easterbrook, Insider Trading, supra note 9, at 325 (published in 
1981). Professor Fox and I also acknowledged these discounts in 2017. See Merritt B. 
Fox & Kevin S. Haeberle, Evaluating Stock-Trading Practices and Their Regulation, 42 J. 
CORP. L. 887, 906 (2017) (“[T]he prospect of greater liquidity results in the issuer’s 
expected future cash flows being discounted to present value at a lower discount rate.”). 
 103 Professors Amihud and Mendelson, joined by Professor Lasse Heje Pedersen, 
survey this literature in YAKOV AMIHUD ET AL., MARKET LIQUIDITY: ASSET PRICING, RISK, 
AND CRISES (2013) [hereinafter MARKET LIQUIDITY]. 
 104 Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Liquidity and Asset Prices: Financial 
Management Implications, 17 FIN. MGMT. 5, 6 (1988) [hereinafter Liquidity]; see also id. 
(“Investors . . . require a compensation from the trading costs they bear. Thus, asset 
prices should reflect their liquidity characteristics.”). 
 105 E.g., AMIHUD ET AL., MARKET LIQUIDITY, supra note 103, at 1 (“If two assets 
generate the same cash flows over time but one of them is less liquid (has higher trading 
costs), rational investors will pay less for the less liquid asset, which costs more to 
trade.”). 
 106 See Amihud & Mendelson, Asset Pricing, supra note 102, at 224 (“This study 
highlights the importance of securities market microstructure in determining asset 
returns, and provides a link between this area and mainstream research on capital 
markets.”). The subsequent literature on asset pricing and liquidity further supports 
this conclusion. See, e.g., BODIE ET AL., supra note 36, at 313 (“[T]he liquidity premium 
that emerges from these studies [following the seminal Amihud and Mendelson article] 
appears to be of roughly the same order of magnitude as the market risk premium, 
suggesting that liquidity should be a first-order consideration when thinking about 
security pricing.”). But see Constantinides, supra note 96, at 847 (concluding that 
“transactions costs have only a second-order effect on the liquidity premium of an 
asset’s rate of return”); id. at 859 (“[A]n investor’s expected utility is insensitive to 
deviations from the optimal portfolio proportions. Hence the liquidity premium due to 
transaction costs is small.”). Notably, the Constantinides (1986) conclusion on the 
magnitude of the discount is inconsistent with the literature that has since emerged, as 
indicated by the second source above. See also AMIHUD ET AL., MARKET LIQUIDITY, supra 
note 103. However, the extent to which the literature maintains that liquidity costs 
alone (as opposed to the cost associated with the risk of liquidity costs changing in the 
future (“liquidity risk”)) are of first-order importance is unclear. 
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each time the security changes hands,107 and securities change hands 
quite often.108  
The literature on liquidity and asset pricing focuses on just that, and 
not just information-asymmetry-based illiquidity. But its central 
premises summarized here nevertheless apply to the latter. Information-
asymmetry-based illiquidity in the market (i.e., that embodied in spread 
and market-movement costs) is nothing more than a type of 
illiquidity.109 Indeed, information asymmetry is generally the leading 
driver of spread and market-movement costs in the market today.110 
To be sure, some buyers will purchase their shares without paying 
spread or market-movement costs. That is generally true of, for 
example, buyers who purchase shares, directly or indirectly, from an 
issuer in an IPO.111 But the costs matter for even these buyers, as they 
still face the prospect of illiquidity when selling down the road.112 Of 
course, one who purchases a stock from an issuer in an IPO and then 
holds it throughout the entire life of the firm (perhaps collecting 
dividends along the way) would not be directly harmed by illiquidity in 
the secondary market. But most investors do not purchase shares in the 
primary market (or even the secondary one) to hold them in that way.113 
Thus, due to the presence of asymmetrically-informed market 
participants and the spread and market-movement costs to which that 
presence gives rise, the market price for stock is affected negatively (i.e., 
discounted) from IPO forward. And this discount of course has the 
 
 107 See Amihud & Mendelson, Liquidity, supra note 104, at 6 (noting “the 
significance of trading costs when their recurring nature is taken into account”); id. 
(“[T]hese costs will be incurred repeatedly whenever the asset is traded.”). 
 108 See, e.g., supra notes 56, 60–61 and accompanying text (discussing current share 
turnover rates and average holding periods).  
 109 See supra Part II.A. 
 110 See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text. 
 111 Buyers can sometimes escape these costs in the secondary market in other ways 
as well. See Haeberle, Information-Asymmetry Story, supra note 19 (discussing market 
mechanisms that allow such avoidance). 
 112 E.g., Ayres, supra note 20, at 977 (“As long as there is a positive probability that 
investors will need to sell their shares while the market is illiquid, the stock price will 
be discounted.”). The uncertain nature of that probability and the amount of future 
illiquidity present added costs for investors. See, e.g., AMIHUD ET AL., MARKET LIQUIDITY, 
supra note 103, at 101-84 (providing an overview of the economics literature on 
“liquidity risk”). 
 113 See, e.g., Katrina Ellis, Who Trades IPOs? A Close Look at the First Days of Trading, 
79 J. FIN. ECON. 339, 344-45 (2006) (finding a 76% mean turnover rate of IPO shares 
in just the first two days of trading); see also supra note 61 and accompanying text 
(discussing typically annual turnover by both portfolio traders and information 
traders). 
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power to greatly alter the extent to which investors are harmed by 
information asymmetry. 
C. The Effect of the Discounts on Buy-and-Hold Ordinary Investors and 
the Larger Universe of Ordinary Investors 
The natural inference from the conclusions of the preceding section 
is that all investors, as a general matter, are able to negate the impact of 
information asymmetry on their investment return thanks to the 
relevant discounts. This appears to be the reigning assumption among 
those who have considered the effects of market discounts more 
generally on ordinary investors.114 But the assumption does not reflect 
important nuance — and overlooks the likely significant benefit of 
information asymmetry on the margin for at least buy-and-hold 
ordinary investors. 
The more precise effect of illiquidity discounts on ordinary investors, 
I theorize, turns on ordinary investors’ investment horizon relative to 
that of the marginal investor. All else being equal, on an expected basis, 
the negative impact of spread and market-movement costs that will be 
incurred by an investor turns on the length of his investment holding 
period.115 The longer the holding period, the better these costs can be 
amortized, and therefore the less the investor must discount to negate 
them.116 The shorter that period, the opposite is true.117 
Professors Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen illustrate this dynamic 
in their book with the following example, which I alter for additional 
clarity: 
 
 114 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. The recent Informed Trading and Its 
Regulation article published by colleagues with whom I have worked closely appears to 
make this assumption, albeit in the context of a far broader discussion. See Fox et al., 
Informed Trading, supra note 43, at 841 (“Freely occurring fundamental value informed 
trading does widen the spread that uniformed traders need to pay. However, this 
widened spread . . . neither helps nor hurts uninformed traders on average because 
share prices are commensurately discounted to reflect this widened spread.”). 
 115 See Amihud & Mendelson, Asset Pricing, supra note 102, at 228 (stating that 
“transaction costs are amortized over the investor’s holding period”). 
 116 See id. at 231 (concluding that “longer investment horizon mitigates the burden 
of transaction costs by enabling their amortization over a longer holding period”); id. at 
228-29 (“The longer [the investor’s holding] period, the smaller the compensation 
required for a given increase in spread.”); Amihud & Mendelson, Liquidity, supra note 
104, at 6-7 (noting that the cost of illiquidity is lower for investors with longer holding 
periods). 
 117 See Amihud & Mendelson, Asset Pricing, supra note 102, at 228-29, 231; Amihud 
& Mendelson, Liquidity, supra note 104, at 6-7. 
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Consider, for example, an asset that pays out a riskless annual 
dividend of $4 in perpetuity and suppose the risk-free annual 
rate is 4%. Absent trading costs, the asset price is $100. 
However, if the asset incurs a trading cost of $0.50 (0.5% of its 
value) [each time it is traded] and is traded once a year, the cash 
flow stream associated with the trading costs has a net present 
value of $12.5 of the asset’s value, meaning that the price of the 
asset drops to $100 – $12.5 = $87.5. Said differently, while a 
transaction cost of 0.5% is a small fraction of the asset’s [initial 
$100] value, it should really be compared to the 4% [($4.00)] 
dividend yield, because both dividends and transaction costs are 
“flows” that are incurred repeatedly. Since the transaction cost 
[($0.50)] is one-eighth [(12.5%)] of the dividend yield 
[($4.00)], [the cost’s] present value is one-eighth [($12.50)] of 
the present value of [the asset’s] dividends [($100)] 
($12.5/$100 = 1/8). Furthermore, if the asset is traded every 
half-year, then after accounting for transaction costs, the asset’s 
value will be about $75, a discount of $25 [because the annual 
transaction fees incurred ($0.50 x 2) take away $1 (or 25%) of 
the $4 expected return [of the asset — thereby requiring a 
discount of $25 on the $100 transaction-cost-free price of the 
future cash flow right represented by the asset.]118 
It follows that the scope of the prevailing discount for information-
asymmetry-based illiquidity will depend on the investment horizon of 
the marginal investors who determine the equilibrium price of stocks.119 
If those investors turn over their investments more rapidly, then they 
will feel the costs of information asymmetry more acutely — and 
discount prices more aggressively. In order to obtain the expected 
return they require to make the investment attractive for that period, 
they will require a larger discount. If they hold their positions for 
longer, the opposite will be true.120 
 
 118 AMIHUD ET AL., MARKET LIQUIDITY, supra note 103, at 3-4. 
 119 See supra note 21. 
 120 AMIHUD ET AL., MARKET LIQUIDITY, supra note 103, at 10 (“Long-term investors 
can effectively depreciate their trading costs over a longer holding period, and thus 
require a smaller compensation in terms of per-period additional return than short-term 
investors.”). Indeed, due to this added return that is available, a liquidity clientele effect 
will result in longer-term investors opting into stocks with more illiquidity. See id. at 4 
(“Higher trading costs can be better borne by long-term investors who trade less 
frequently and, therefore, can depreciate them over a longer investment horizon.”). This 
will decrease the premium that is available to long-term investors. See id. (“[W]hile 
expected return is an increasing function of trading costs, it should be concave 
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Ordinary investors will either have an investment horizon that is 
shorter than, equal to, or longer than that of these price setters. Roughly 
speaking, some ordinary investors will therefore, respectively, be hurt 
by information asymmetry, some left unaffected by it, and others will 
benefit from it.121 On one end of the spectrum are ordinary investors 
pursuing information trading and noise trading approaches. These 
investors have relatively short investment horizons.122 On the other end 
are those buy-and-hold ordinary investors who index the market as a 
whole, and who thus generally have long investment horizons.123 But 
who are the marginal investors who set the size of the discount? 
The identity of the marginal investor has long eluded market 
observers.124 But the remarkably short duration of average holding 
periods reported today and related turnover data suggests that this 
unobservable investor pursues an active investment strategy,125 whether 
traceable to an information or noise approach (or even an active 
portfolio one that does more than merely invest in an index of the entire 
market or some broad part thereof).126 If this is true, then it is the impact 
of information asymmetry costs on active investors’ expected return that 
determines the relevant discount. If, due to information asymmetry 
costs associated with a stock’s purchase and sale, these investors value 
the stock at, e.g., $75/share rather than the $100 price that they would 
pay absent illiquidity, then they will only be willing to buy the stock up 
until the point at which its market price is $75. 
Strikingly, to the extent the marginal investor pursues an active 
information or noise strategy, her investment horizon is dramatically 
shorter than that of buy-and-hold ordinary investors — and indeed 
portfolio-trading ordinary investors as a whole.127 It follows that 
 
(increasing at a decreasing rate), reflecting the mitigating effect of long-term holding 
periods on the sensitivity of return to transaction costs.”). 
 121 Those who benefit from information asymmetry are better off not just because 
they will be able to purchase a given dividend stream at a lower price, but also because 
they can obtain capital appreciation at a lower price. In other words, all else being equal, 
the longer-term investor would benefit even if the directors retained earnings in the 
firm rather than distributing them to shareholders via dividends. 
 122 See supra Parts I.B, I.C. 
 123 See supra Parts I.A. Those pursuing more active portfolio trading than mere buy-
and-hold indexing also have relatively long horizons, albeit to a lesser degree. See supra 
Part I.A. 
 124 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 125 See supra notes 56–63 and accompanying text (describing average holding 
periods of just four months, the closely related high turnover rates, and related reasons 
to believe that active investing involves short holding periods). 
 126 See supra Parts I.B, I.C, I.A, respectively. 
 127 See supra Parts I.A, I.B. 
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information asymmetry on at least the margin provides more of the very 
thing these investors target by investing: expected return. Accordingly, 
the reductions in information asymmetry provided by the core disclosure, 
fraud, and insider trading rules appear to be an unattractive feature of 
the law for at least buy-and-hold ordinary investors (qua investors). 
Of course, there are costs that might have come along with those 
investors’ longer holding periods.128 The main one is that the investors 
might have refrained from changes to their investment portfolio that 
would otherwise have brought them utility.129 To in fact be worse off 
due to the relevant reductions in information asymmetry, the lost-
return cost the investors incur would have to outweigh whatever gain 
the reductions provide them in terms of utility from less trade 
forbearance. But for at least those buy-and-hold investors who, even 
with more liquid trading, would not be making changes to their 
portfolio during their investment period, there is no such loss in utility. 
And most buy-and-hold ordinary investors likely suffer little from 
information-asymmetry-based trade forbearance. For one thing, the 
market index in which they invest rebalances itself, thereby reducing 
the utility that can be gained from more frequent trading.130 For 
another, these investors’ risk preferences generally should not be 
changing in a way that calls for significant trading each year, let alone 
in less than the average holding period that is said to exist today (four 
months131). Moreover, empirical research suggests that the scope of the 
utility reduction is small for even those buy-and-hold investors and 
more active portfolio traders who, all else being equal, would prefer to 
make such changes over time, yet omit to because of the relevant 
costs.132 
Do the other types of avoidance costs change this thinking? 
Quantifying the costs of the game in which investors try to transact 
opposite each other without incurring the full spread and market-
movement costs present in the best displayed quotes in the market133 is 
far beyond the scope of this Article. But any argument that buy-and-
hold ordinary investors’ share of those costs changes the above thinking 
in a way that results in the lost return from the relevant reductions in 
information asymmetry being dominated by saved avoidance costs 
 
 128 See supra Part II.A; supra note 98. 
 129 See supra Part II.A. 
 130 See supra Part I.A. 
 131 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 132 See Constantinides, supra note 96, at 859 (finding that “an investor’s expected 
utility is insensitive to deviations from the optimal portfolio proportions”). 
 133 See supra Part II.A (describing these costs). 
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would require, at a minimum, a look at costs that — to my knowledge 
— have never even triggered serious investor-protection concern. These 
insights therefore present a challenge to the idea that the reductions to 
information asymmetry provided by the core securities laws are even a 
neutral proposition for these investors (qua investors). That these 
ordinary individuals are trading in line with the consensus ordinary-
investor approach encouraged by the SEC and social science134 makes 
the challenge one that applies to conventional thinking on information 
asymmetry and investor protection more generally. 
Still, a larger question remains: What does the identification of this 
long-overlooked cost of the reductions in information asymmetry 
provided by the core securities laws mean for the larger universe of 
ordinary investors? Those reductions are also, I argue, disconcerting 
from the perspective of these investors (as investors). This is because 
 
 134 E.g., MALKIEL, supra note 13, at 266-67 (“Because active management generally fails 
to provide excess returns and also tends to generate greater tax burdens for investors as 
they regularly realize capital gains, the advantage of passive management holds with even 
greater force.”); id. at 407 (“The indexing strategy is the one I most highly recommend.”); 
Ayres & Fox, supra note 57, at 453 (“[T]he consensus among economists and financial 
professionals is surprisingly straightforward: Absent an alpha opportunity, one should 
hold a portfolio which is (1) well-diversified, (2) low-cost, and (3) exposes you to age-
appropriate stock market risk.”); Chester S. Spatt, Chief Economist and Dir., U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, Address to the Pennsylvania Association of Public Employee Retirement 
Systems Forum: Public Plan Investment and the Role of Indexing (Apr. 12, 2007), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch041207css.htm (stating that, as a result of the 
many advantages of passive investing, the author “tend[s] to advocate personally the use 
of low-cost passive and index investment products” and that “[f]or uninformed investors 
low-cost passive strategies are very sensible given the competition within the marketplace 
and efficiency of the capital market”); Kathleen Elkins, Jack Bogle Taught a Generation 
How to Invest for the Long Term — This Was His Strategy, CNBC, (Jan. 17, 2019, 12:02 
PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/17/jack-bogle-taught-a-generation-how-to-invest-
for-the-long-term-this-was-his-strategy.html (“‘[T]he simplest and most efficient 
investment strategy is to buy and hold all of the nation’s publicly held businesses at very 
low cost.’” (quoting Jack Bogle)); Risk and Return, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor. 
gov/additional-resources/specialized-resources/youth/teachers-classroom-resources/risk-
return (last visited Oct. 12, 2019) (“[I]nvestors who’ve adopted a ‘buy and hold’ approach 
to investing tend to come out ahead of those who try to time the market.”); Lori Schock, 
Women Can Level the Playing Field in Investing, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/ 
additional-resources/specialized-resources/directors-take/women-can-level-playing-field-
investing (last visited Oct. 12, 2019) (“Women tend to buy and hold onto their 
investments, while research shows that men tend to try to time the market and trade more 
frequently. In fact, the investing approach used by many women is a good way to plan for 
the long-term.”). In addition to the aforementioned sources on the consensus of the SEC 
and social science, the judges of the chief corporate law tribunal in the United States have 
also supported this thinking. E.g., Strine, supra note 63, at 12 (stating that “[m]any of the 
wisest end-user investors do choose investment funds that do not churn: index funds,” 
and discussing the social science backing this view). 
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the reductions likely result in an investment-return wash for the 
ordinary investors that pursue a trading strategy that is as active as the 
price setters, a benefit to those who are even more active, yet a harm to 
the vast portion that trades in and out of stock positions less frequently. 
More precisely, which ordinary investors are as active as the price 
setters, which are even more active, and which are more passive? The 
answer depends on the type of trading pursued by the majority of 
ordinary investors and, like above, the identity of the price setters. If the 
price setters are investors who follow an information or noise approach, 
then the full universe of passive ordinary investors faces the ordinary-
investor cost identified in this Article. To the extent the majority of 
ordinary investors follow a passive approach, a challenge along the same 
lines as that made above then can be made, albeit with respect to 
ordinary investors as a whole. But if the price setters are portfolio 
traders who pursue a more active rebalancing approach,135 then it is 
only the more passive ordinary investors (namely, buy-and-hold ones) 
who are worse off in terms of investment return. All the while, ordinary 
investors that engage in an even more active approach (whether 
through information, noise, or portfolio trading) are in fact better off in 
terms of investment return thanks to the reductions in information 
asymmetry. 
How this all nets out for ordinary investors as a whole when the laws’ 
effects on the additional costs of stock-market information asymmetry 
(i.e., the avoidance costs136) are factored in, I cannot say. In short, the 
picture here is less discernable than that drawn earlier in this Section 
with respect to the reductions in information asymmetry provided by 
the core laws and buy-and-hold ordinary investors. Without more 
precise data on holding periods tied to specific investors trading in 
specific types of ways, conclusions for ordinary investors as a whole are 
tough to state with confidence. However, three clear conclusions have 
already been drawn, and a fourth can now be stated. The first such 
conclusion was that the reductions in information asymmetry likely 
impose an investment-return harm on buy-and-hold ordinary investors. 
The second was that this harm must be weighed against only limited 
 
 135 See supra notes 36, 41–42 and accompanying text. With the massive shift from 
active to passive management over the past decade or two, it is possible that the 
marginal investor is more passive than active. See, e.g., Asjylyn Loder, Do Passive 
Investors Move Markets? They Can, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2018, 4:37 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/etfs-unlikely-to-cause-widespread-market-disruptions-
research-shows-1531906200 (“Assets in passive funds that try to match the market 
rather than beat it have quintupled in the past decade to $6.9 trillion, according to 
research firm Morningstar.”). 
 136 See supra Part II.A (describing these costs). 
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gains from those same reductions for these investors. The third was that 
the fact that these investors are pursuing the precise investment strategy 
encouraged by the SEC and social science rendered these first two 
effects, when taken together, disconcerting from an investor-protection 
perspective. And the fourth conclusion I add here is that the closely 
related effects on ordinary investors as a whole are also disconcerting 
from an investor-protection perspective. 
Lastly, it is worth emphasizing two final points. First, if the marginal 
investor is a buy-and-hold one, then the relevant reductions in 
information asymmetry are simply investment-return neutral for buy-
and-hold ordinary investors. After all, if this is the case, the costs of the 
relevant illiquidity for these investors would likely be fully reflected in 
the market discount — and thus the price of the stock. 
Second, the precise scope of both the ordinary investor costs and 
benefits sketched out above based on the well-founded assumption of a 
more active marginal investor remains unknown beyond the broad 
disconcerting contours drawn here.137 Indeed, the scope of the likely 
investment return harm to buy-and-hold ordinary investors attributable 
to the relevant reductions turns on a set of empirical questions identified 
for the first time here. As explained in this Section, that scope centers on 
the investment timeframe of the marginal investor relative to the investor 
group at issue. Likewise, the scope of the trade-avoidance costs turns on 
(1) the amount of the utility loss suffered by the members of the group 
who refrain from trading due to the relevant illiquidity (if any), and 
(2) the costs associated with seeking to trade at lower spread and/or 
market-movement costs incurred by the same (if any). 
* * * 
This Part has provided long-overlooked nuance on the relationship 
between the core securities laws that reduce information asymmetry in 
 
 137 Interestingly, even with respect to those information trading ordinary investors 
for whom the relevant costs are a wash, information asymmetry more generally might 
be net positive. After all, information asymmetry is the key to information trading 
success. See supra Part I.B. Indeed, one can even question whether the relevant spread 
and market-movement costs are properly classified as costs for information-trading 
investors. If these traders truly have better information than the market, then the ask 
prices they pay above and beyond the then-current market value of the stock can be 
viewed as prices that are closer to the true value of the stock. The same basic principle 
applies with respect to market movement “costs” for these traders: as they accumulate 
larger positions that they have reason to believe are underpriced, they pay prices that 
are closer to the true value. Whatever the appropriate characterization of these “costs” 
for these traders, the brief overview of them in Part II.A makes clear that they are in fact 
costs for at least portfolio traders — and therefore the vast majority of buy-and-hold 
ordinary investors. 
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the stock market and ordinary investor wellbeing. As explained above, 
market makers incur losses to better-informed traders while operating 
vulnerably on the front lines of the market. In response to the 
expectation of those losses, they make changes that result in other 
traders — and therefore investors — incurring information asymmetry 
costs in two main forms, one relating to spreads and the other to market 
movements. Any comprehensive discussion of the ordinary investor 
effects of the core laws that limit informational unevenness among 
market participants should thus include consideration of how traders 
are affected by each of these costs, as well as the related costs that are 
sometimes incurred to avoid them. 
This Part began such a discussion. In particular, it built on, among 
more basic aspects of economic theory, well-established principles 
arising out of a foundational work that bridged principles of 
microstructure with those of mainstream finance. In so doing, it 
explained how investors discount the amount they will pay for stock to 
reflect the prospect of illiquidity, thereby erasing costs of information 
asymmetry from investment returns. But the extent to which the 
prevailing discount performs that function for any group of investors 
turns on the investment horizon of those investors in relation to the 
same of those who determine the discount. Consequently, the relevant 
reductions in information asymmetry, I theorized, will improve the 
investment return of some portion of the ordinary investor universe, be 
a wash for that of another, and harm that of the one that remains. The 
extent to which one of these three dynamics dominates is an empirical 
question first identified above that turns on the holding period of the 
marginal investor relative to that of the group of ordinary investors at 
issue (including the group of “all ordinary investors”). Building on yet 
additional economic theory, this Part also viewed this newly identified 
cost of the relevant reductions against more familiar benefits (those 
associated with the reductions’ effect on what I have termed “avoidance 
costs”). In the end, there was much reason to think that at least buy-
and-hold ordinary investors fell inside the circle of the harmed. That 
those market participants invest in line with the consensus guidance of 
the SEC and social science means that this observation is one that 
challenges conventional thinking about information asymmetry and 
investor protection more generally. Moreover, the implications for the 
larger universe of ordinary investors as a whole were also disconcerting 
given the typical sustained holding periods of major groups of ordinary 
investors versus the short average holding periods in the market today. 
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INVESTOR-PROTECTION DIVIDE AND THE 
LAW 
The nuanced positive conclusions about the reductions to 
informational unevenness at the heart of modern securities law offered 
above have considerable normative implications. The main ones relate 
to the investor-protection divide and the appropriate focus of investor-
protection efforts in the law. In this final Part, I examine each of these 
sets of implications in turn. 
A. Implications for the Investor-Protection Divide 
For decades now, investor-protection advocates have maintained that 
the core securities laws mitigate informational unevenness in obvious 
ways, thereby helping ordinary investors.138 All the while, the law and 
economics orthodoxy has asserted that these laws do little, if anything, 
on this front.139 But the theories offered in the preceding Part tell us 
much about the extent to which each of these competing views is 
supported by reality. 
Most strikingly, the relevant law and economics argument against the 
core laws is understated. When it comes to at least buy-and-hold 
ordinary investors, one must be dubious of the idea that the reductions 
in information asymmetry these laws provide is even a neutral 
proposition.140 Instead, there is a compelling story to be told in which 
these reductions impose a serious cost on these investors — and harm 
them on net.141 The law and economics orthodoxy has thus been too 
meek on this front. 
The other side of this same coin is that the investor-protection 
advocates have overstated their case. The case for arguing that the 
relevant information asymmetry (the increased amount that would exist 
without the core securities laws) presents a significant problem for 
ordinary investors as a whole should now seem far-fetched. This is for 
two reasons. First, some significant portion of the ordinary investor 
universe likely benefits from that asymmetry (and that portion is mostly 
composed of those who are investing in exactly the way in which the 
government and consensus view economists have told them they should 
invest142). Second, there is much reason to be skeptical of the idea that 
 
 138 See supra notes 4, 6–10 and accompanying text. 
 139 See supra notes 5, 11–17 and accompanying text.  
 140 See supra Part II.C. 
 141 See id. 
 142 See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
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there is any larger negative net effect of that asymmetry on ordinary 
investors as a whole.143 
Still, also inherent in my positive conclusions is that there are likely 
many ordinary investors who are in fact helped by the laws at issue.144 
That is because my analysis shows that information asymmetry on the 
margin does harm some ordinary investors — namely, those who are 
engaged in active trading.145 This group may even include those who 
are engaged in especially active portfolio trading, depending mainly on 
whether they prefer to shift from consumption to savings or vice versa 
with more frequency than the marginal investor.146 These investors’ 
active trading provides them with benefits. Yet, information asymmetry 
stings them because the reigning discount in the market is set by 
investors with longer investment horizons, and is therefore insufficient 
to address their information-asymmetry costs. Moreover, these same 
ordinary investors — and more — also benefit from the reductions in 
information asymmetry to the extent that those reductions reduce their 
avoidance costs. 
One could therefore argue that, if the goal is to protect ordinary 
investors, pursuing disclosure, fraud, and insider trading law to limit 
information asymmetry makes sense. After all, those laws will reduce 
the extent to which some ordinary investors incur spread and/or 
market-movement costs that are not negated by the prevailing market 
discounts. And it will limit the extent to which those (and other) 
ordinary investors lose out on the utility they would gain from portfolio 
adjustments they would make in the absence of those costs, and the 
extent to which they must allocate resources to trade with lower spread 
and market-movement costs. That said, three significant limitations on 
this thinking must be acknowledged. 
First, the group of ordinary investors that is actually harmed by 
information asymmetry on the margin (and therefore helped by the 
reductions in information asymmetry provided by the securities laws) 
might be small enough relative to those who are helped by that 
asymmetry (and therefore hurt by the reductions) that the legal efforts 
in focus would be of limited import to ordinary investors as a whole. 
Just how likely is it that there is a sizeable enough portion of the 
ordinary investor universe that trades in and out of stocks at a faster clip 
than those investors whose conduct gives rise to average holding 
 
 143 See supra Part II.C. 
 144 See id. 
 145 See id. 
 146 See id. 
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periods in the four-month range and average turnover rates of 100% and 
higher?147 And how likely is it that the size of this group of ordinary 
investors comes anywhere close to dominating that composed of longer-
term ordinary investors? Avoidance-cost benefits must too be factored 
in,148 but it is hard to paint this as some kind of seriously problematic 
investor-protection picture. 
Second, market forces alone might provide enough protection on this 
front, thereby obviating the need to deploy disclosure, fraud, and 
insider trading rules toward reducing information asymmetry to protect 
ordinary investors. Firms have an incentive to reduce information 
asymmetry.149 Reductions in such asymmetry decrease market 
discounts that, by definition, harm the value of company stock.150 For 
that reason, in the absence of these laws, firms should be expected to 
disclose a large amount of information to the public, and to do so with 
integrity.151 Whether or not that is the case turns on a larger debate that 
has gone on for decades about market forces and these areas of law.152 
 
 147 See supra notes 56, 60–61 and accompanying text (discussing holding periods 
and turnover rates today). 
 148 Supra Part II.A (discussing these costs of information asymmetry). 
 149 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2367 (1998) [hereinafter Empowering Investors] (noting 
empirical research on the power of capital markets to assess the impact of legal regimes 
on investment returns and the “entrepreneurial motivation [of firms] to reduce capital 
costs”); Ayres, supra note 20, at 952-53 (noting that “even before the federal securities 
laws mandated honest disclosure of financial statements, firms attempted to precommit 
to honesty by hiring independent accountants to verify their truth”); Mahoney, supra 
note 13, at 647 (“Issuers of securities speak to the market often. Though some of the 
information they provide is mandated by the federal securities laws, many of their 
statements are made without legal compulsion.”). 
 150 See Amihud & Mendelson, Asset Pricing, supra note 102, at 246 (“The higher 
yields required on higher-spread stocks give firms an incentive to increase the liquidity 
of their securities, thus reducing their opportunity cost of capital. Consequently, 
liquidity-increasing financial policies may increase the value of the firm.”); id. 
(“[I]nformation disclosures may be construed as investments in increased liquidity.”); 
id. at 224 (“[L]iquidity-increasing financial policies can reduce the firm’s opportunity 
cost of capital . . . .”). 
 151 E.g., Ayres, supra note 20, at 946 (stating that if the law allowed firms to lie, 
“market forces [would] drive virtually all firms to commit to honesty, and at least some 
[would] commit to (or establish reputations for) remaining silent”). 
 152 For the view that private ordering is insufficient to bring about optimal 
disclosure, see Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer 
Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999). But see EASTERBROOK 
& FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 1, at 276-314; ROBERTA ROMANO, THE 
ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES REGULATION (2002); 
Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 1, at 709-13 (describing the 
potential advantages of a market regime for securities disclosure law, but concluding 
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But even if one sides with the proponents of private ordering, it is hard 
to imagine that firm managers would sufficiently refrain from the 
private gains associated with insider trading in order to reduce the scope 
of illiquidity discounts in the market in the name of reducing the 
company cost of capital. Moreover, disclosure by competitors and other 
firms decreases information asymmetry, and firms may therefore suffer 
from a collective action problem when it comes to finding a sufficient 
level of disclosure for investor-protection purposes. Consequently, one 
would think that the securities laws, at a minimum, provide some 
material reduction to information asymmetry beyond what markets 
would accomplish on their own. But it is nevertheless likely that market 
forces alone would do much to mitigate the effect of information 
asymmetry discounts that are too small for some ordinary investors 
(i.e., the frequent traders), thereby limiting the appeal of legal efforts 
aimed at protecting even that one subset of the ordinary investor 
universe that is clearly made better off by the reductions traceable to 
current law. 
Third, any relevant investor-protection gains for the portion of 
investors that is harmed by information asymmetry would come at a 
cost to other ordinary investors. This final point follows from one of the 
main points of this Article, found in the previous Part’s conclusion that 
the reductions provided by the core securities laws were likely costly 
for at least significant portions of the ordinary investor universe — 
including the portion investing in the very way ordinary investors are 
told to invest by the SEC and social science. 
It is worth noting that if the marginal investor is a buy-and-hold one 
who does nothing more than index the market as a whole, then the 
general position of the law and economics orthodoxy (i.e., that the 
reductions do little if anything for ordinary investors) may be correct. 
But even in this unlikely scenario, one would still have to consider what 
the reductions did to help various ordinary investors in terms of 
alleviating trade-avoidance costs. In the end, an interesting debate, 
informed by the framework set forth here, might ensue between the 
orthodoxy and investor-protection advocates. 
All this is not to say that there aren’t other arguments to be made in 
favor of the core securities laws from an ordinary-investor fairness 
and/or protection perspective. For one thing, a broader set of fairness 
and investor-protection issues beyond the information-asymmetry-
 
that, based on the empirical research thus far, it is uncertain whether leaving the issue 
to the market is actually better than the status quo); Romano, Empowering Investors, 
supra note 149. 
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based one in focus in this Article153 can be identified.154 Those who have 
a broader view of investor protection may nevertheless still take issue 
with uneven informational footing in the stock market. For example, 
for them, any inability for ordinary direct-trading investors to have 
equal access to new information (and thus equal trading profit 
opportunities, if not outcomes), may in and of itself pose a problematic 
unfairness, no matter what that access means for the number at the 
bottom of 401(k) statements. For another, even if it mainly turns on the 
theory detailed above and the corresponding facts about investor types 
and time horizons, the precise pros and cons of information asymmetry 
on the margin for the groups noted above remains an unanswered 
empirical question.155 But the discussion provided in this Section shows 
why an investor-protection dialogue informed by the nuanced positive 
theories set forth in the previous Part is in order.156 Indeed, if nothing 
else, all of the above description and analysis shows that the 
conventional wisdom on information asymmetry and the protection of 
ordinary investors would benefit from this newly added nuance to the 
scholarly literature on securities law. 
 
 153 See supra notes 2–3 (limiting my focus to the relationship between the core efforts 
to curb stock-market information asymmetry, on the one hand, and ordinary-investor 
wellbeing on the other). 
 154 For an overview of that broader set of issues, see Michael D. Guttentag, Protection 
from What? Investor Protection and the JOBS Act, 13 UC DAVIS BUS. L.J. 207 (2013). See 
also Haeberle, Information-Asymmetry Story, supra note 19 (focusing on the larger social 
costs of stock market information asymmetry). 
 155 See supra Part II.C. 
 156 Interestingly, even if the reductions to information asymmetry at issue harm buy-
and-hold ordinary investors on net (or even the larger universe of ordinary investors on 
net), investor welfare arguments might still be used to argue against any change to the 
status quo. This is because any such change that increased information asymmetry 
would reduce the value of the existing investment positions of all ordinary investors. After 
all, the reigning discount for information-asymmetry-based illiquidity is based on 
current levels (and expected levels) of the same. See supra Part II.B. An exogenous 
change that unexpectedly increased those levels (and therefore increased the market 
discount) would increase expected returns on existing investment positions. But in so 
doing, it would reduce the value of those positions for at least those who already hold 
them and who plan on selling out of them sooner rather than later. Investments made 
there forward by the relevant ordinary investors would, all else being equal, have higher 
expected returns without having to incur that reduction in value. But, a strange debate 
might result, where the interests of many current ordinary investors are weighed against 
those of these future ordinary investors. 
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B. Implications for the Law 
The theories should also change at least the focus of investor-
protection efforts, as they cut strongly in favor of shifting any such focus 
away from the core securities laws and to areas of regulation that have 
received far less attention.157 
1. Shifting Away From the Core Securities Laws 
The theories of this Article do not question the more general support 
in American society for laws that protect ordinary investors. And the 
SEC’s mission is to “protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient 
markets, and facilitate capital formation.”158 Consistent with this, the 
SEC is empowered by Congress to make rules pursuant to an investor-
protection standard159 — and to do so even if that means eschewing 
larger social considerations. Congress can do the same under, at a 
minimum, its Commerce Clause powers. But given the conclusions 
offered above, the focus of any such effort with an eye on additional 
regulation should be moved from the core securities laws to other less 
prominent areas. A brief discussion of insider trading law and the 
investor-protection promise of areas of securities law that receive far 
less attention makes this point. 
Insider trading law has traditionally garnered much attention from 
scholarly and popular audiences alike. A good amount of the attention 
has been on the extent to which this law protects ordinary investors, 
with the investor-protection advocates arguing for robust trading 
restrictions160 and many law and economics critics supporting 
legalization.161 But the theories set out above demonstrate that, 
 
 157 My theories do not touch on the value of the core securities laws for ordinary 
investors in the IPO market. See supra note 2. It is possible that further reductions to 
information asymmetry that those laws might provide in that market would be worth 
pursuing as well. 
 158 What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 10, 2013) (emphasis added), 
https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html. 
 159 E.g., Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, The Efficiency Criterion for Securities Regulation: Investor 
Welfare or Total Surplus? 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 85, 94 (2015) (“[T]he SEC can engage in 
rulemaking to promote either investor protection or a more general ‘public interest’ 
goal.”). Interestingly, the agency generally pursues the former approach. See id. at 90 
(“At best, the SEC can be seen as analyzing its rules’ net effects on the economic welfare 
of its primary constituents: investors.”); id. at 126 (“[T]he SEC has historically 
employed the investor welfare approach.”). 
 160 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 161 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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paradoxically, the imposition of insider trading law should be 
disconcerting from an investor-protection perspective. 
For those that have followed the academic and policy debate in this 
area, a notable observation should follow. For about a half century now, 
investor-protection advocates have maintained that the trading 
restriction protects ordinary investors, albeit at a cost to price accuracy. 
In other words, price accuracy has to be traded off in order to generate 
these ordinary investor gains. Highly regarded theoretical work from 
the not too distant past presented a serious challenge to the 
conventional wisdom that insider trading law was bad for price 
accuracy, arguing just the opposite: that the restriction was justified 
based on its positive impact on price accuracy.162 If credited, that theory 
along with the one presented in this Article show that there is a 
compelling story to be told in which the conventional wisdom has been 
upside down. In reality, by restricting insider trading, one could argue, 
the law likely trades off well-being for at least buy-and-hold ordinary 
investors in return for higher levels of price accuracy. Glibly put, even 
if not by original intention, insider trading law throws the ordinary 
investors under the bus in order to obtain more accurate pricing and its 
benefits for the wider economy. 
The insider trading example is just one such illustration of my point. 
Other aspects of the core securities laws would provide similar ones. 
One might look to the latest additions to the Regulation S-K’s disclosure 
requirements, or the controversial overlay of private securities fraud 
litigation under the Section 10(b) for analogous stories. 
Ultimately, whatever the precise trade-offs at play with disclosure, 
fraud, and insider trading law (and various individual aspects of those 
core areas of securities law), the theories and analysis provided in this 
Article show that one should be dubious of investor-protection stories 
that center on these laws’ effect on information asymmetry in the 
secondary market. 
2. Shifting Toward Less Prominent Areas of Securities Law 
The conclusions offered earlier also reveal the promise held by lesser-
studied areas of the law. Thinking briefly about two such areas (trading 
market structure and investment advice duties) in this context makes 
the point. 
The analysis in this work and a related series of recent works163 can 
be built on to show how the regulation of the structure of the stock 
 
 162 See Goshen & Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, supra note 9. 
 163 See supra note 18; infra note 182. 
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market can help ordinary investors avoid the costs of information 
asymmetry.164 For example, despite much criticism of off-exchange 
trading platforms in policymaker and popular circles alike, the above 
analysis and conclusions show how those platforms could help ordinary 
investors avoid these costs. Many such platforms separate ordinary 
investor trading from sophisticated investor trading to a high degree. 
They can therefore help ordinary investors avoid the spread and market-
movement costs that now reign on exchanges.165 This is because the 
spreads and market movements that are most relevant to a trader are 
those associated with the venue on which she is trading, as each trading 
venue will reflect the informational characteristics of the trading it 
hosts.166 So, to the extent off-exchange platforms can segregate out 
ordinary investor trading, they can help ordinary investors avoid those 
costs — thereby protecting them in meaningful ways. 
Indeed, at least one group of ordinary investors — that engaging in 
direct trading through retail-level brokerage accounts — is especially 
able to avoid information asymmetry costs thanks to this market 
structure. These individuals have almost 100% of their orders to buy 
and sell stock on demand internalized by broker-dealers rather than 
routed to exchanges and the like.167 Because these orders are generally 
assumed to be uninformed,168 the market makers that trade opposite 
them are willing to provide their services at tighter spreads and subject 
 
 164 More bang for ordinary investors’ buck might be obtained by focusing instead on 
the structure of other securities markets, such as those for corporate or municipal 
bonds. But the example in the text nevertheless makes the present point: that the 
investor-protection focus relating to ordinary investors who invest in the stock market 
(if any focus) should shift away from the core securities laws. 
 165 See Kevin S. Haeberle, Stock-Market Law and the Accuracy of Public Companies’ 
Stock Prices, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 121, 148-50 (2015) [hereinafter Stock-Market 
Law] (explaining how these platforms help ordinary investors avoid information 
asymmetry costs, and why that help reduces the information trader incentive to generate 
fundamental value analysis, and, in turn, price accuracy and its larger social benefits). 
 166 See supra Parts I.D, II.A (discussing market makers and their response to 
asymmetrically informed trade). 
 167 See, e.g., Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg. 3,594, 3,600 
(Apr. 21, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242) (“A review of the order routing 
disclosures required by Rule 606 of Regulation NMS of eight broker-dealers with 
significant retail customer accounts reveals that nearly 100% of their customer market 
orders are routed to OTC market makers.”). 
 168 E.g., Christine A. Parlour & Uday Rajan, Payment for Order Flow, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 
379, 381 (2003) (“Retail order flow is widely believed to be uninformed.”); Comment 
Letter from Suhas Daftuar, Managing Dir., Hudson River Trading LLC, to Elizabeth M. 
Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 1 (Nov. 30, 2011) (“Retail investors’ orders 
are generally considered to be uninformed, in that they are unlikely to cause or have 
information about short-term price movements.”). 
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to less sensitive price-movement triggers.169 This translates to lower 
information asymmetry costs for these investors. Consequently, 
assuming sufficient competition, it is likely that these particular 
ordinary investors are able to purchase stocks at bid and ask prices that 
reflect less information-asymmetry-based illiquidity than present 
elsewhere in the market, yet that are valued at a lower price thanks to 
that same information asymmetry.170 Moreover, because these direct 
trading individual investors generally do not transact in large size, they 
do not incur market-movement costs. The import of these final points 
is considerable, as internalization of these orders is thought to cover a 
significant portion of all stock trading today,171 including the vast 
majority of all individual-investor, retail-level trading.172 
Lastly, regulation of the market for investment advice has similar 
potential. One need only think of the consumer protection issues 
associated with conflicted advice from brokers to see this potential,173 
 
 169 See supra Part I & Part II.A; see, e.g., Daftuar, supra note 168, at 1 (noting that 
internalization is “generally driven by internalizers’ ability to discriminate among 
potential customers, taking the other side of retail orders which, unlike orders from 
proprietary trading firms or institutional investors, are unlikely to have short-term 
adverse impact on the liquidity provider”). 
 170 See generally Kevin S. Haeberle, Discrimination Platforms, 42 J. CORP. L. 809 
(2017) [hereinafter Discrimination Platforms] (discussing the distinct trading 
environments at exchanges and various types of off-exchange platforms). 
 171 It has been said that around 20% of all reported stock trading is internalized. E.g., 
Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, supra note 167, at 15; Dark Pools, 
Internalization, and Equity Market Quality, ISSUE BRIEF (CFA Inst., Charlottesville, Va.), 
Nov. 2012, at 1, 3. The majority of this internalization is thought to be attributable to 
direct trading ordinary investors, with more no doubt traceable to those same investors, 
albeit indirectly through investment funds whose orders are internalized. 
 172 See Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, supra note 167, at 21. Other 
ordinary investor-friendly devices of the contemporary stock market provide similar 
benefits, and may (taken together) provide yet additional reasons for thinking that 
information asymmetry on the margin is helping at least buy-and-hold ordinary 
investors today. For example, patient ordinary investors are able to transact at the 
midpoint of the bid-ask spread thanks to “midpoint liquidity orders” offered by all 
major exchanges. This saves these investors from both spread and market-movement 
costs. The complexity of these devices and the ways in which they help direct trading 
and indirect trading ordinary investors avoid these costs is beyond the scope of this 
Article. But I describe them in detail in making related points in my contemporaneous 
work on information asymmetry from a social welfare perspective. See Haeberle, 
Information-Asymmetry Story, supra note 19. 
 173 Recent efforts by the Obama-era Department of Labor and the Trump-era SEC 
perhaps reflect at least implicit agreement with these points. For the recent rule adopted 
by the SEC, see Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 
Fed. Reg. 39,178 (Aug. 9, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). For an overview 
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or, perhaps more controversially, the fees associated with active mutual 
fund investments.174 Whether or not these types of regulatory changes 
targeted at this distinct market generate additional social wealth or just 
transfer existing amounts, they should thus be appealing to investor-
protection advocates. 
Of course, taken together, the central findings of this Article and the 
investor welfare standard noted earlier in this Section suggest that the 
SEC could reduce the scope of the core securities laws in the name of 
protecting at least buy-and-hold ordinary investors. Indeed, the agency 
could even mandate disclosure maximums, encourage corporate lying, 
and green light more insider trading. But for three main reasons, these 
approaches do not follow from my analysis. First, whatever the state of 
norms today, these approaches are unlikely for obvious political 
reasons. Second, for perhaps most, the larger positive role of the core 
securities laws175 compels something roughly along their current form. 
Third, my central positive claims in this Article are merely that the 
reductions in information asymmetry provided by the core securities 
laws likely impose a cost on buy-and-hold ordinary investors while 
conferring only limited benefits, and that for closely related reasons we 
should be concerned about their effect on ordinary investors as a 
whole.176 Thus, the most attractive normative argument is for the 
investor-protection focus to be shifted to other areas of securities 
regulation rather than for considering a rollback of the core ones. 
* * * 
This Part discussed the most notable policy prescriptions that flowed 
from Part II’s positive theories. Given the disconcerting picture of the 
relationship between the reductions to information asymmetry 
provided by the core securities laws and at least buy-and-hold ordinary-
investor well-being drawn in Part II, I showed that changes are in order 
for both thinking and action. In particular, this Part laid a foundation 
for a more informed discussion about information asymmetry and the 
protection of ordinary investors than that which has reigned to date. It 
also provided a nudge in favor of (and an accompanying roadmap for) 
shifting any focus on efforts to protect ordinary investors in the stock 
 
of the DOL effort and what it might have done for ordinary investors, see Benjamin P. 
Edwards, Conflicts & Capital Allocation, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 181, 224-26 (2017). 
 174 See supra note 50 and accompanying text (suggesting the existence of “closet 
indexing” by “active” funds). 
 175 See supra notes 11, 51–52 and accompanying text (noting the efficiency benefits 
that the core securities laws are said to generate). 
 176 See supra Part II.C. 
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market away from the core securities laws and to less prominent areas 
of regulation. 
Of course, as first noted at the outset of this Article, there are larger 
costs and benefits of laws that reduce stock market information 
asymmetry. But those costs and benefits are not the subject of this work. 
Likewise, any change to the existing laws would likely change the 
quantity and quality of trading by ordinary investors and others, thereby 
bringing about secondary and tertiary effects on ordinary investors and 
others. For example, if the laws were rolled back, buy-and-hold 
ordinary investors may find themselves better off as investors, yet worse 
of as members of society. After all, a rollback of the core laws would 
increase information asymmetry on the margin, and therefore harm 
shorter-term traders. To the extent information traders consequently 
withdrew from the market and prices became less accurate, capital 
might be misallocated and firms mismanaged. These observations 
provide further reason — beyond mere political appeal — to avoid 
tinkering with the core securities laws in the name of investor 
protection, and to instead shift much of the investor-protection focus in 
the stock market to less prominent areas of regulation, such as those 
discussed in this Part. 
Lastly, as these final thoughts indicate, this Article’s theories scratch 
the surface of their even larger implications. I hope to touch more on 
them in my broader work on information asymmetry and social 
welfare,177 as well as in other planned work. But it is worth noting here 
that the magnitude of the social effects of significant change to the 
reductions in information asymmetry provided by the core securities 
might be far larger with respect to something not in focus above. In this 
Article, I have focused on investor protection along with some added 
nuance about the larger efficiency concerns of the securities laws. But 
my analysis has considerable implications for the relationship between 
the core securities laws, on the one hand, and the composition of the 
ownership base of corporate America, on the other. If the reductions to 
information asymmetry at issue are taking away investment return from 
longer-term investors, then they are likely increasing the proportion of 
public company shares owned by shorter-term investors.178 After all, by 
reducing information asymmetry, they make shares more liquid and 
thus more attractive to those investors. They may therefore be pushing 
the managers of those shareholders toward a shorter-term approach. 
Given the central emphasis in both economics and corporate law on 
 
 177 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 178 See supra note 120.  
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long-term value maximization for public firms, this additional long-
overlooked effect of the core securities laws, if substantiated as a matter 
of theory and/or empirics, would constitute an enormous elephant in 
the securities law room. Indeed, any such negative effects of the 
securities laws along these lines might dwarf even the considerable 
investor-protection ones identified in this Article. 
CONCLUSION 
Conclusory statements about securities law and the protection of 
ordinary investors have long been commonplace among policymakers 
and scholars. For investor-protection advocates, those statements have 
embraced a view of the world in which discrepancies in knowledge 
among stock market participants very much matter for ordinary 
investors, meaning that disclosure, fraud, and insider trading laws do 
too. For the law and economics orthodoxy, the statements have instead 
largely dismissed the idea of these core securities laws serving any 
significant investor-protection role relating to ordinary investors. For 
decades, these two sides of this investor-protection divide have 
generally talked past each other, with neither offering close enough 
analysis of how information asymmetry actually affects ordinary 
investors. 
This Article attempted to close this investor-protection gap and move 
forward thinking on securities law. It did so by undertaking a detailed 
review of economic relationships between stock market participants 
with an eye on the costs of information asymmetry for ordinary 
investors. This review revealed that the reductions to information 
asymmetry provided by the core securities laws likely take away 
investment return for at least buy-and-hold ordinary investors — 
investors who are investing in accordance with the guidance of the SEC 
and the lessons of social science. All the while, the same reductions 
provided only limited assistance to these same investors. The result for 
ordinary investors as a whole was also disconcerting, although less clear 
on net. 
The main relevant implications of these theories for the investor-
protection divide and the content of the law were also significant. 
Perhaps most notably for the former, the law and economics orthodoxy 
has understated its case against the core of modern securities law as an 
area of investor protection. With respect to the latter, much more 
ordinary investor bang for the buck might be generated by shifting focus 
away from that core and toward more peripheral areas of regulation. 
Whether the majority of any resulting work comes from those who 
specialize in securities law as opposed to consumer protection, contract 
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law, or fiduciary law is not clear. But these positive and normative 
conclusions have made room for legal improvement by giving much 
reason to think that the real ordinary investor killer, if any, is still on 
the loose. 
Of course, legal efforts to reduce information asymmetry could be 
driven by the goal of improving overall welfare, as opposed to simply 
ordinary investor welfare.179 Although beyond the scope of this work, 
the conventional wisdom appears to be that the reductions in 
information asymmetry provided by the core securities laws give rise to 
net social benefits well beyond any traceable to ordinary investors.180 
Or, reducing information asymmetry might improve confidence in the 
market and mitigate larger perceptions of the stock market as an unfair 
social institution. Pursuing the core securities laws to limit those 
perceptions might therefore be desirable to many, even if it means 
indulging false assumptions about the laws’ effects on ordinary 
investors. 
Stepping back to more broadly view this Article’s examination, 
theoretical conclusions, and legal implications provides a final, broader 
insight. The study shows what can be learned from careful examinations 
of the mechanics and economics of markets. Here, the focus was on 
what is perhaps the most prominent securities market in the world, and 
the precise harms key suppliers of long-term investment capital do and 
do not suffer as a result of the presence of better-informed traders in 
that market. But this approach can be used to reveal much more. For 
example, related studies can be pursued, such as the one mentioned 
several times above that contemplates the scope of the larger social costs 
and benefits of stock-market information asymmetry.181 The approach 
can likewise be used to examine other areas of securities law beyond the 
core ones mandating disclosure, prohibiting fraud, and restricting 
insider trading. This observation is apparent from what can be seen as 
an emerging area of legal scholarship — of which this work is a now 
part — on a wide array of securities laws seen from a market-
 
 179 See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 180 E.g., supra note 150 and accompanying text. But see, e.g., Romano, Empowering 
Investors, supra note 149 (arguing that private ordering could obtain a more optimal 
result). Interestingly, the analysis offered in this Article suggests that the ordinary 
investor effects of the core securities laws may very well constitute a cost in any such 
larger cost-benefit analysis. All else being equal, any such analysis might therefore 
contain much less weight in the benefit column and much more in the cost one than 
present in existing evaluations. Also interestingly, the point raised in the final paragraph 
in Part III above regarding the ownership base of public companies may present a 
challenge to the convention wisdom about the securities laws and social welfare. 
 181 Supra notes 19, 82, 97, 111, 154 & 172. 
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microstructure perspective.182 Given the insights arising from this 
literature on the stock market and its regulation, one must wonder what 
such examinations would tell us about the validity of common views 
specific to the regulation of markets for things both far more simple and 
complex than public company stock. 
 
 182 See supra note 18 (discussing this emerging literature and its lag behind the 
related literature on mainstream finance and the law). For specific works incorporating 
principles of microstructure into the legal literature over the past five years (listed in 
reverse chronological order), see, for example, Robert P. Bartlett & Justin McCrary, How 
Rigged Are Stock Markets? Evidence from Microsecond Timestamps, J. FIN. MARKETS 
(forthcoming 2020) (examining high-frequency trading practices); Haeberle & 
Henderson, New Market-Based Approach, supra note 6 (proposing the construction and 
use of a well-regulated information market to address the core disclosure, fraud, and 
insider-trading problems of modern securities law); Paul Mahoney & Gabriel 
Rauterberg, The Regulation of Trading Markets: A Survey and Evaluation, in SECURITIES 
MARKET ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 221-281 (2018); Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. 
Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, Stock Market Manipulation and Its Regulation, 35 YALE 
J. ON REG. 67 (2018); Kevin S. Haeberle & M. Todd Henderson, Making a Market for 
Corporate Disclosure, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 383 (2018) (arguing that a well-regulated 
information market would generate more corporate disclosure, released more 
frequently, in improved formats); Informed Trading, supra note 43 (thinking about a 
variety of information-based trading practices and rules from a microstructure 
perspective); Fox & Haeberle, supra note 102 (setting forth an evaluative framework 
for judging a range of stock-market practices and their regulation); Discrimination 
Platforms, supra note 170 (examining the trade transparency and trader-access practices 
at exchanges and alternative trading systems today); Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. 
Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, The New Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense, 65 DUKE 
L.J. 191 (2015) (examining and evaluating controversial stock market practices); 
Haeberle, Stock-Market Law, supra note 165. 
